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1. The Context 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The need for electronic alternatives to hand-written signatures is increasing with 
the rise of electronic commerce. For the purposes of this study, electronic 
commerce (E-commerce) is perceived as doing business over the Internet, but may 
more generally be understood as doing business electronically, for instance by means 
of EDI, fax, telephone, etc. In the last few years, the Internet has developed 
from a glorified catalogue with companies advertising their products on a 
passive web site, into a real marketplace with interactive web sites offering a 
wide range of products and services, which can be ordered, paid for and 
sometimes even delivered on-line. The nature of the Internet and its increasingly 
commercial use has confronted governments, businesses and Internet users in 
general with a spectrum of legal questions, one of which is the legal validity of 
electronic or digital signatures. To address or not to address this legal problem is 
a question legislators world-wide have been asking themselves, many of whom 
have decided in favour of legislation and issued (draft) laws. The wide variety of 
divergent legislation was one of the starting points of this research (see Chapter 
3). 
 
The research presented here was carried out as part of the Dutch National 
Programme Information Technology and Law (ITeR) and is a continuation of 
earlier ITeR research, i.e. The Legal Status of the Digital Signature by Van der Hof 
(1997) and Writings and Signatures: An outdated concept? by Huydecoper & Van 
Esch (1997).1 The first study presented an inventory of legal developments and 
practical initiatives with respect to digital signatures in some of the European 
                                                   
1 Van der Hof (1997) Huydecoper & Van Esch (1997) Neither of these studies is available in 
English, but of the first study a summary in English is on-line available at: 
<http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/hof/ds-summ.htm>. 
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Union Member States. The second study explored the functions of writings and 
signatures as they were intended by the legislator, and evaluated the feasibility of 
these functions in situations where electronic alternatives to writings and 
signatures are used. The authors inter alia designed a three-prong test 
(functional-analysis test) to determine the feasibility of electronic-signature 
techniques to fulfil signature requirements in legislation. In this test, firstly, the 
legislative considerations for requiring a signature with respect to particular legal 
actions must be determined. Secondly, functions and characteristics of 
signatures, which were considered necessary in order to incorporate signature 
requirements in legislation, should be identified. Finally, the possibility of 
performing the same functions by applying electronic signatures must be 
explored. An affirmative outcome of the third prong would mean that the 
electronic signature is an adequate substitute for the hand-written signature. The 
functional-analysis test was a second starting point for the present research (see 
Chapter 4). 
1.2 A veritable tower of Babel 
As a meticulous reader will have noted, the previous section mentioned 
‘electronic signatures’ and ‘digital signatures’. The two concepts should, 
however, not be confused, in the sense that, although a ‘digital signature’ is an 
‘electronic signature’, the latter is a much broader concept than the former. 
Electronic signature includes all technologies for replacing hand-written 
signatures in an electronic environment, examples of which are the scanned 
signature, the signature by means of a digital pen and the PIN-code. Digital 
signature is a name for technological applications using asymmetric 
cryptography, also referred to as public-key encryption systems, to ensure the 
authenticity of electronic messages and guarantee the integrity of the contents of 
these messages.2 The digital signature has many different appearances, such as 
fail-stop digital signatures, blind signatures and undeniable digital signatures (see 
table 1).3 The digital signature is a technology for signing electronic documents 
electronically, thus, it is an electronic signature, though of a particular kind. The 
co-existence of these concepts has caused an unfortunate confusion with 
sweeping consequences.  
 
The confusion started with (from a lawyer's viewpoint) erroneously calling the 
application of asymmetric cryptography for authentication purposes a digital 
                                                   
2 For further reading on the technical details of digital signatures and asymmetric encryption: 
Baum & Ford (1997). 
3 Schneier (1996), p. 34-44, 81-82, 85 and 112-115. 
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signature. It is, in fact, not a signature in a legal sense at all, though it can be used 
for signing electronic documents.4 The digital signature can, as stated earlier, 
verify the authenticity of electronic messages and guarantee the integrity of the 
contents. Thus, it does not merely establish origin or integrity with respect to 
individuals as is required for signing purposes, but it can also authenticate, for 
instance, servers, web sites, computer software, or any other data that is 
distributed or stored digitally.5  Digital signatures, therefore, have a much 
broader use than an electronic alternative for hand-written signatures. Often, 
however, this is not sufficiently recognised.  
Dumortier & Van Eecke mentioned the example of the Belgian draft law on 
digital signatures, which should, according to some people, allow legal persons 
to sign documents.  The underlying idea was the fact that web sites often belong 
to legal persons and legal persons should, therefore, be able to sign. However, 
there is a difference, which was not recognised by this proposal's proponents, 
between using the digital-signature technology to stimulate the development of 
e-commerce and the legal consequences of digitally signing an electronic 
document. Whereas legal persons should be allowed to do the former, it is not 
obvious that their actually signing a document will have these legal 
consequences. As Dumortier & Van Eecke stated, the question of allowing legal 
persons to sign is of a significantly different nature and is not specifically linked 
to the use of digital signatures.6 
 
One option for dealing with the terminological confusion is to change the name 
by calling it, for example, a digital seal or digital envelope. But 'digital signature' 
is nowadays so commonly used that it seems impossible to rename the 
technology.  It is important though, to be precise in publications such as this 
about the exact meaning of the term, the differences with the broader 'electronic 
signature', and the various possible applications of the technology. Hopefully, 
awareness of the issue and its adverse consequences (i.e. confusion and non-
perspicuous discussions) will lead to a more careful use of the term. 
                                                   
4 This is however not to say that it is an effective means of signing legally in every instance. 
Whereas digital signatures may provide for authentification of electronic messages, other 
functions (see 4.2.) may be more problematic. A more appropriate perception of digital 
signatures may be that of digital envelopes, because there is no relation with contents of 
the signed document. The signer does not have to or will in some instances (in case of e.g. 
blind signatures) not be able to view the contents of the electronic document to digitally 
sign it. 
5 From a technical perspective the term signature is understood as any technology which links 
an entity with data, whereas from a legal perspective a signature is merely the link 
between a person and data (i.e. a document). 
6 Dumortier & Van Eecke (1999a), p. 3-10. See also Kuner (1998), p. 715, discussing the 
situation in Civil Law countries where only a natural person can sign, which limitation does 
not exist under Common Law. 









Digital signature Protocols based on asymmetric encryption, which can 
ensure the authenticity and integrity of electronic data. 
 Examples of digital 
signatures 
Blind signature Digital signature protocol, which 
allows a person to sign a document 
without knowledge of the contents 
of the document. 
 Fail-stop digital 
signature 
Digital signature protocol, which 
allows a signature-holder to prove 
that a digital signature forged after 
a brute force attack is a fake. 
 Proxy 
signature 
Digital signature protocol, which 
allows the signer to give authority 
to sign a message to someone 





Digital signature protocol, which 
cannot be verified without the 
signer's consent (to prevent e.g. 
exact copying of digital signatures).  
Designated confirmer signatures 
allow others than the signer to 
verify the signer's signature. 
Table 1: Definitions of electronic and digital signatures7 
1.3 Legislative chaos  
In addition to, and partly as a consequence of the terminological confusion, 
electronic and digital signatures as well as related topics, such as Certification 
Authorities,8 Public-Key Infrastructures,9 are the subject of many, quite different 
laws or regulations world-wide.  
 
As stated, the legislative chaos is partly a result of the terminological shambles. 
Depending on the application of the digital-signature technology, i.e. general use 
to ensure the reliability of transactions or specific use for signing purposes to 
fulfil formal requirements, the legislator has focussed upon, the subject of 
legislation is (on a sliding scale) more technically or more legally oriented. The 
                                                   
7 These definitions are based on Schneier (1996), supra note 3. 
8 A Certification Authority (CA) is a trusted third party (TTP), which certifies public keys, 
publishes certificates and revokes certificates. 
9 A Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a hierarchic or horizontal structure of CAs, which are 
subjected to the same organisational, technical and procedural rules and which may 
(cross-) certify each other. 
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technical approach, at one end of the scale, means recognising the digital-
signature technology as a standard for secure electronic commerce and is mainly 
concerned with the general use of the digital-signature technology. The legal 
approach, at the other end of the scale, encompasses the legal equation of hand-
written and electronic or digital signatures and, thus, aims at the digital signature 
for signing purposes. To complicate matters even more, between these 
extremes, legislation with combined technical and legal approaches can be 
identified, which, e.g., focus on a certain technology, such as digital signatures, 
that is considered adequate for legally signing electronic documents. Within the 
legal and technical approaches to regulating digital signatures, the methods of 
approach may differ as well. For example, in equating traditional and electronic 
signatures, some laws specify an open approach, merely providing that 
electronic signatures will not be exempted from legal effect, whereas other laws 
impose the aforementioned functional-analysis test to specific legal provisions. 
The sum of all these differences is legislative chaos. 
  
Another complicating factor in electronic and digital-signature legislation is that 
often requirements of form are not dealt with in one legislative instrument. In 
other words, electronic or digital signature legislation does not consistently 
address writings, signatures and other formal requirements, but in some 
countries merely addresses the signature as such.  
From a legal and combined technical-legal perspective, this is an unfortunate 
development, since both requirements are bound to each other and need to be 
addressed coherently in order to achieve legal certainty in, for instance, matters 
of enforceability of legal actions and evidentiary matters.  From a purely 
technical perspective, which is, as mentioned earlier, concerned with stimulating 
the general use of digital signatures to achieve reliability in electronic commerce, 
this approach seems less troublesome, since it is concerned with the technology 
as such and not with legal requirements of form. However, this is only true 
insofar as these technical regulations do not have any (implicit) legal 
implications. 
The consequence of this legislative chaos is that electronic or digital-signature 
legislation seems to achieve the opposite, namely, legal insecurity and 
unpredictability in electronic commerce. The co-existence of these many, 
mutually exclusive (national or local) laws and regulations may seriously impede 
the smooth development of a truly international phenomenon such as electronic 
commerce. It is true that international organisations such as the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) try to co-ordinate these 
efforts by issuing, e.g., model laws. These honourable initiatives have, however, 
produced only a still too limited effect.  
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1.4 Definition of research 
The main aim of this research is to provide recommendations to the legislator 
when addressing legal requirements of form in legislation. This objective is 
encapsulated in the following research question: 
 
Which considerations should be taken into account, if the legislator addresses the subject matter 
of legal requirements of form in the light of ICT developments? 
 
In order to formulate these recommendations, it is necessary to further outline 
the context of electronic authentication and the regulatory environment within 
which this issue is addressed as well as the approaches already taken by national 
and international regulators.  
 
Chapter 2 sets off with some general topics, which are important to put the 
issue of electronic authentication regulation in perspective. These topics are:  
1. The attraction of the digital signature, 
2. Technology neutrality versus technology dependence, 
3. National versus international approaches, 
4. Civil law versus common law perspective, 
5. Government regulation versus self-regulation. 
 
In Chapter 3, the approaches towards electronic-authentication legislation and 
regulations are identified and analysed. Of each approach, several examples are 
presented and evaluated with respect to each other. These approaches are: 
1. The digital signature approach, 
2. The two-prong approach, and 
3. The minimalist approach. 
At the end of this chapter we have presented a synthesis of these approaches in 
pursuance of which interim conclusions are drawn. In these interim conclusions, 
we have given preference to the minimalist approach. 
 
Chapter 4 further explores the principle of minimalism by focussing on the 
functionalist approach. Within the minimalist approach, we have distinguished 
between the specific-functionalist approach and the generic-functionalist 
approach. In order to allow for some fine-tuning, both approaches will be 
further elaborated. In the end we have again shown a preference for one of the 
approaches, i.e. the generic-functionalist approach. 
 
On the basis of the previous chapters, Chapter 5 finally formulates the results 
of this research as recommendations to the legislator on how to handle legal 
requirements of form when adjusting legislation to the digital environment.  
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2. General overture 
Before we explore the approaches, which can be identified with respect to 
electronic-authentication legislation, some general considerations are necessary 
to put the matter into perspective: 
 
(1) The attraction of the digital signature. 
(2) Technology neutrality versus technology dependence. 
(3) National versus international approaches. 
(4) Civil law versus common law perspective. 
(5) Regulation versus self-regulation. 
2.1 The attraction of the digital signature 
The digital signature, and asymmetric-encryption technology in general, is an 
important technology from the viewpoint of secure electronic commerce. 
Several applications have been developed using asymmetric encryption to 
transmit data securely over the Internet, such as SET (Secure Electronic 
Transactions),10 SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)11 and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy).12  
 
A digital signature is a document-dependent way of encrypting data by applying 
asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric encryption uses a key pair, consisting of a 
private and a public key. To digitally sign a document, first, a hash value must be 
created. A hash value (also: hash or message digest) is the result of a 
mathematical calculation (using algorithms also called hash functions), which 
transforms the document into a string of a certain length. The hash value is, 
subsequently, signed by the signer’s private key and added to the document. The 
                                                   
10 SET is a cryptographic protocol, developed by Visa and Mastercard, for making secure 
bankcard payments over the Internet. 
11 SSL is a cryptographic protocol for sending data, such as credit-card data and bank-account 
numbers, securely via the Word Wide Web. Websites URLs, which are protected by SSL, 
start with ‘https’ instead of ‘http’. 
12 PGP is a software program for encrypting electronic data, most notably e-mail messages. 
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addressee can check the (supposed) origin of the document by applying the 
signer’s public key to the digital signature and checking whether the hashes 
match. The digital signature further ensures the integrity of the document, 
because the hash value will have changed when the document has been 
tampered with.13  
 
Until now, the digital signature is considered the most adequate means of 
providing an electronic equivalent to hand-written signatures and, thus, a great 
deal of the attention is specifically given to this technology. However, apart 
from the question if the digital signature is legally valuable in every instance,14 
other alternatives to traditional signatures exist as well and rapid ICT 
developments may in the future lead to new technologies to “sign” electronic 
documents. A recently developed technique for secure credit card payments 
(virtual credit acrd (VCC)) does not require a digital signature at all but provides 
nonetheless a simple and reliable solution for authorising credit card payments 
over the Internet.15 All in all, it is important to keep an open mind toward new 
emerging technologies: every regulatory and legislative initiative should be 
regarded in the light of new developments. 
Moreover it is important to note that technologies may differ as to their 
reliability and security and not in every instance the highest reliability and 
security level will be required.16 There is a tendency of requiring higher levels of 
reliability than is necessary for the purposes to be served and often policy 
makers and legislators seem to lose sight of the fact that hand-written signature 
were never that reliable either, rather on the contrary.17 Demanding higher 
                                                   
13 For further reading on the technical details of digital signatures and asymmetric encryption: 
Baum & Ford (1997).  
14 See Note 4 and Paragraph 4.3.1.3. 
15 See Automatiseringsgids, 24 September 1999. VCC is developed by Bernacchi and has 
already been introduced by the Brazilian bank Unibanco. In this system, the consumer 
pays by providing a onetime VCC-number to the on-line shop, which he has received by 
his bank. When the consumer makes a request for a VCC-number, the bank is informed of 
the transaction and the payee. The bank will pay only once on presentation of the VCC-
number and only to the person or company mentioned as payee by the consumer. In this 
scenario, the consumer does not have to provide his credit card number when making 
payments over the Internet. The system can be used for virtually any kind of transaction. 
16 Apart from technical suitability, economic factors will most certainly play an important role as 
well, because of the cost effectiveness of applications. We will, however, not further, 
elaborate on this issue. 
17 See also Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996), 
No. 16: “[T]he adoption of the functional-equivalent approach should not result in imposing 
on users of electronic commerce more stringent standards of security (and the related 
costs) than in a paper-based environment”. Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), different reliability 
requirements exist, however, in legal systems. The German legal system, for instance, 
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reliability requirements merely because it is possible, would be a major (and 
unjustified) impediment to the development of e-commerce.18  
2.2 Technology neutrality versus technology dependence 
Legislative approaches to new technologies must accommodate the inherent 
tension between the goal of rendering legislation time resistant and the goal of 
prescribing specific legal consequences to new technologies, thus, providing 
legal certainty.19 Also with respect to electronic authentication legislation the 
problem of how to deal with the dilemma has presented itself: should legislation 
be more technology-specific or more technology-neutral?  
In the national and international discussions on electronic authentication, the 
question of whether to regulate certain specific technologies or not is clearly 
reflected. The different manner in which legislators and policymakers have 
sought to accommodate the conflicting technology-neutral and technology-
specific approaches largely defines the typology of existing approaches toward 
electronic authentication legislation in theory. Legislation is on a sliding scale 
more technology-specific or more technology-neutral, which amounts to the 
contrast of more or less legal security.  
As there is another side to every coin, each approach in the debate has its pros 
and cons. Both the technology-specific and technology-neutral approach have 
their drawbacks and benefits. 
2.2.1 Pros and cons of technology-specific legislation 
Some legislators have focussed on specific technologies in their legislation. This 
kind of legislation may be perceived as originating from specific technological 
developments. Such a definition would, however, be overly broad and a more 
appropriate definition is that of legislation, which is based on one or more 
specific techniques.20 The extent of the concept of 'technology-specific 
legislation' is not completely clear.21 Most technology-specific laws with respect 
to electronic authentication are, however, based on one technique, namely the 
digital signature, and not technological developments as such. Legislators and 
policymakers in favour of technology-specific legislation believe that the 
continuing expansion of new technologies requires a known and reliable system 
                                                                                                                        
sets rather high reliability standards for signatures if compared with the legal system of the 
United States legal. See also Huls-Report (1998), paragraph 2.5.3. 
18 See also UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 16. 
19 Baker & Yeo (1999). 
20 See also De Cock Buning (1998), p.129 
21 Stuyt (1999), p.18. 
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with established legal consequences. Thus, they prefer to enact legislation, which 
specifically addresses the use of the digital-signature technique, and to save 
future issues raised by new techniques for a later date.22 Technology-specific 
legislation permits detailed statutory alignment and policymaking in the context 
of the known capabilities or weaknesses of the particular technology23 in order 
to provide the necessary legal security.  
 
The Memorandum Legislation for the Electronic Highway from the Dutch Cabinet 
lists some circumstances, in which technology-specific provisions would be 
appropriate: 
 
(a) In cases where these provisions define the extent of a regulation, 
(b) In cases where legal subjects need insight in a (complicated) technology,24  
(c) If technology-neutral rules provide insufficient, little or no hold regarding 
the rights and duties of legal subjects, and 
(d) In cases where these provisions are necessary to determine the conditions 
for government infringement of the legal subjects’ rights and duties.25 
 
Thus, there may be developments, which would make a technology-specific 
approach recommendable. One of the main benefits is that technology-
dependent approaches may lead to more legal security than technology-neutral 
approaches, which would prevent the courts from having to develop case law 
on the subject.26 Some supporters of technology-specific rules even claim that 
the technology-neutral lobby is mostly based on a myth: neutrality is more of a 
political buzzword than a clearly defined legal concept.27 The urge to prescribe 
legal consequences to certain technologies stems from the experience of certain 
techniques and their reliability, which renders them feasible for usage in a legal 
context. Over the last years, this view to legislation, which emanates from 
technological developments, has resulted in laws specifically regulating digital 
signatures. 
2.2.2 Pros and cons of technology-neutral legislation 
The technology-neutral approach refers to legislation, which (under certain 
conditions) permits the use of electronic signatures or even other electronic 
authentication methods in instances where otherwise a legal requirement of 
                                                   
22 Baker &Yeo (1999). 
23 Ford & Baum (1997), p. 296.  
24 See also: Arkenbout (1998), p.161. 
25 Memorandum Dutch Cabinet (1998), Nos. 1-2, p. 14. 
26 See for this example: Beary (1998). 
27 Baum (1999).  
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form could not be met, but does not specify any technique or implementation 
of a certain technique.28 Technology-neutral legislation may, thus, give the same 
legal status to electronically signed documents as to written and signed 
documents whatever form of electronic signature is used. If necessary, authority 
to issue more detailed rules on specific matters may then be delegated to the 
appropriate administrative body. 
This approach, which is also referred to as the minimal approach, provides 
flexibility in the sense that various technical methods, including new techniques 
that may be developed in the future, can be used to comply with formal 
requirements. The proponents of technique-neutral legislation are of the 
opinion that this kind of legislation will be better suited to survive technological 
changes.29 Moreover, legislators and policymakers in favour of technology-
neutral legislation are concerned that premature endorsement of a particular 
technology will set them outside the mainstream of technology and legislative 
initiatives as well as developments internationally.30 
Presently, the technology-neutral approach to electronic authentication 
legislation seems to become ever more prominent. New legislative initiatives 
generally choose a more open approach, which leaves room for new 
technological developments. One of the reasons is the growing awareness as to 
the fact that other technologies, such as dynamic signature analysis,31 are 
catching up and may soon compete with digital signature technologies or, at 
least, present another adequate and functional authentication technology in 
certain situations. The use of different authentication methods must, therefore, 
not be excluded, since technologies will (be able to) serve different purposes and 
some technologies will be better suited “ to do the job” than others.32 There will 
not exist just one technology, which is the most adequate to be applied in every 
situation. 
 
                                                   
28 Beary (1998). 
29 See, e.g., De Cock Buning (1998), p. 134. 
30 Baker & Yeo (1999). 
31 ILPF Survey (1999). Dynamic-signature analysis uses a digital pen, which records the speed 
and pressure when signing a document. Examples of dynamic-signature analysis are 
Penop (<http://www.penop.com>) and Cybersign  
(<http://www.cybersign.com>). 
32 Digital-signature applications, e.g., are not very user-friendly (yet), and, therefore, less suited 
for consumer transactions. 
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 Advantages Disadvantages 
Technology-
dependent legislation 
• Allows for legal certainty 
• Provides a reliable system 
with established legal 
consequences 
• Prevents the court from 
having to develop case-law 
on the subject 
• Permits detailed statutory 
alignment and policymaking 
in the context of the known 
capabilities weakness of the 
particular technology 
• May soon have to be 
adjusted  
• Premature endorsement 
of a particular 
technology may set it 
outside the mainstream 
of technological 
developments 
• May distort the natural 
market flow 




• Allows for flexibility 
• Is not soon outdated 
• May survive technological 
changes 
• Leaves room for new 
technological developments 
• Intents to ensure legal 
equivalence among various 
new technological 
approaches 
• Allows for legal 
uncertainty 
• Is more of a political 
buzzword than a clearly 
defined legal concept  
• Language of neutrality 
my undermine support 
for an already proven 
and available 
technology 
• Leaves room for new 
technology to develop 
and capture the market 
Table 2: Technology-dependent versus technology-independent legislation 
2.2.3 Final remarks 
The e-commerce market is of a dynamic character where technological 
developments are going fast, thus, new transaction and payment ways will 
evolve at a fast pace, using new and different means of authentication.33 A good 
example can be found in the field of Internet payment systems. The market 
expects a high flight from the introduction of the SET (Secure Electronic 
Transaction) technology, an asymmetric encryption based technology developed 
jointly by VISA and Mastercard. Meanwhile, however, other payment systems 
are under construction as well, one of which is iPIN. iPIN enables payment of 
small Internet transactions via an ISP or telecommunications company by using 
a PIN-code. The application may be much more consumer-friendly than SET, 
which in contrast to iPIN requires downloading and installing of software 
(electronic wallet).34 At the same time, it is a great opportunity for ISPs and 
                                                   
33 Dumortier & Van Eecke (1999a), p.5, as a result of rapid changes in the environment of 
information technology electronic signatures could in the future be produced by other 
means than the technology of the digital signature. See also Paragraph 2.1. 
34 Information on iPIN is available at <http://www.ipin.com>. Information on SET is on-line 
available at <http://www.mastercard.com/shoponline/set/set.html>. 
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telecommunications companies to enter the Internet payment market by serving 
as intermediaries, since they already have important accounting possibilities in 
their primary functions. A second example, which seems very promising, has 
already been mentioned in paragraph 2.1: the Virtual Credit Card (VCC). 
The possibilities seem to be infinite and developments to invent ever more 
innovative, easy-to-use and fast methods for doing business on the Internet are 
continuing, yet, the direction in which these developments will go is often 
unpredictable. In our opinion, it is important not to impede these developments 
by issuing premature legislation, which distorts rather than stimulates the 
market.35 A more technology-neutral approach will most likely be better suited 
to deal with future technologies than legislation that focuses solely on a specific 
technology.  
2.3 National versus international 
National and international legislative initiatives with respect to electronic 
authentication are often lumped together. For the purpose of the question raised 
in this study of how to address electronic authentication legally, it is important 
to differentiate between the different levels.  
International approaches to electronic authentication are quickly gaining 
importance and even seem to outstrip national initiatives as a result of the 
inherent international character of the Internet and, thus, of electronic 
commerce. The international nature of the Internet requires an international 
approach toward regulatory matters in order to ensure world-wide legal 
predictability.  
However, in the short term uniform international legislation will in many 
instances be a utopia rather than an ideal within reach. The cultural and legal 
differences among countries world-wide are too much of a barrier for quick 
resolution of the many legal issues raised by electronic commerce, one of which 
is electronic authentication.  
For this reason, it is of the utmost importance that national governments put 
their legislation in order, if they intend to stay in the running called e-commerce. 
As regards the requirements of form, national legislators will have to analyse and 
evaluate their national legislation in order to get rid of outdated concepts or 
adjust them to fit the electronic environment. By doing so, they should, 
however, act in line with international developments and avoid as much as 
possible acting on their own initiative: they should think internationally rather 
than at all costs adhering to their own legal concepts. 
 
                                                   
35 See Biddle (1997). 
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National legislation is or can be concerned with matters in a much more 
concrete and detailed way, whereas international initiatives in the short run 
better deal with the issue in a more abstract and open way in order to be widely 
acceptable. An exception is the European Union, which aims at harmonising 
national legislation and, therefore, may be considered more of a national 
character rather than being a truly international initiative. Nevertheless, both the 
(Draft) Electronic Signatures Directive and the Draft E-Commerce Directive 
(see 3.2.2.2.) are interesting measures from an international perspective, since 
both directives aim at aligning the differing national legislations in order to 
facilitate and stimulate the European market. It is "just" one step further to do 
the same for the international market. 
2.4 Common Law versus Civil Law 
Kuner & Miedbrodt write: 
 
“While there has been considerable regulatory activity concerning electronic 
signatures in recent years in a number of countries, so far a lack of understanding 
about the differing roles of signatures and written form in different legal systems has 
contributed to difficulties implementing internationally-acceptable rules for electronic 
signatures.”36 
 
As regards these “differing roles”, Kuner & Miedbrodt refer to the differences 
between Common Law and Civil Law.37 
 
Kuner & Miedbrodt identify major differences between Common Law and Civil 
Law with respect to the meaning of requirements of form. In the United States, 
for instance, the emphasis is on the signer’s intention to be bound, rather than 
on the security of the signing process.38 As an additional requirement, the 
signature must be recorded on a tangible medium. If these factors are satisfied, a 
signature will be considered legally valid. Furthermore, Kuner & Miedbrodt say 
that in the United States formal requirements have largely decreased in 
significance.39 
                                                   
36 Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 144. 
37 See also Kuner (1998), p. 714. 
38 Putting one’s X or mark on a document will be considered a signature in Anglo-American 
countries but not in, e.g., the Netherlands, Huydecoper & Van Esch (1997), p. 116. 
39 Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 146 and 150. In the United States, the Drafting Committee on 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is considering to repeal the Statute of Frauds with 
respect to the sale of goods, Baum & Ford (1997), p. 44. Information on the UCC Draft 
Revisions is available at: 
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The question rises, why so many electronic authentication laws have been issued 
or are pending in the USA. According to Kuner & Miedbrodt, this has not so 
much to do with the admissibility of electronic signatures as such, as with legal 
insecurity surrounding the evidentiary status of electronic signatures.40  
 
In contrast, as an example of a Civil Law system, German legal requirements of 
form cannot be moulded as liberally as in the U.S. situation, which amounts to 
the need for a high level of reliability and security in order to satisfy these 
requirements.41 For instance, written documents must be personally signed and 
stamps, typewritten or faxed signatures are not considered personally signed.42 If 
a document is appropriately, i.e. manually, signed, it has an enhanced evidentiary 
status, meaning the signed declaration is presumed to originate from the signer. 
An electronic document cannot have this status, since it cannot be manually 
signed. However, electronic documents may still be presented as visual or expert 
evidence.43 
The heavy requirements set by German law explain the choice for a digital 
signature law, setting the secure digital-signature technique as a standard and at 
the same time establishing a security infrastructure (see paragraph 3.2.1.1.). 
 
Different concepts of writings and signatures will have an influence on the 
development of national electronic-authentication legislation and these laws 
should, therefore, be contemplated against the background of the legal system 
concerned to fully grasp their meaning.  
2.5 Government regulation versus self-regulation? 
The different regulatory initiatives in the field of electronic authentication can 
be qualified as government regulation, industry self-regulation or a mixture of 
both, which is called co-regulation.  
 
The majority of the regulatory initiatives in the field of electronic authentication 
fall under the category of government regulation. Governments are adjusting 
                                                                                                                        
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>. 
40 Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 146. 
41 See also the German Government Position Paper on the International Recognition of Digital 
Signatures, available at:  
<http://www.kuner.com/data/sig/gov_digsig_recognition.html> 
 and Schulzki-Haddouti (1999). 
42 In the Netherlands, however, a signature by facsimile is allowed. Because of the requirement 
that a signature must show a person’s handwriting, typewritten signatures and stamps 
using printed letters are not allowed. Huydecoper & Van Esch (1997), p. 116. 
43 Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 146-149.  
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existing legislation or issue new legislation to accommodate the digital era. In 
cases where, e.g., requirements of form are fundamental requirements for the 
validity of legal acts, such as contracts, and the admissibility as evidence or the 
evidential value of electronic documents is at issue, government intervention 
may well be necessary to resolve legal uncertainty. In many instances legal 
provisions in this respect will be of a mandatory nature, meaning that they 
cannot be set aside via contracts. Self-regulation is then less or not suitable for 
resolving legal uncertainty, unless governments were to be involved as well (co-
regulation). 
 
Some initiatives can be classified as industry self-regulation, which is sometimes 
also referred to as soft law or best practices. Especially in an area that 
experiences rapid technological changes, such as e-commerce, self-regulation 
can be an important means of regulation due to its flexibility and practical as 
well as realistic nature.  
Industry self-regulation may appear in different forms, for instance, self-
regulation by setting a technical standard or self-regulation by putting forward 
basic legal principles. An example of the technical standard self-regulatory 
approach is, for instance, the work of the PKIX Working Group of the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF).44 In 1995, the Working Group was established 
with the intention to develop Internet standards needed to support a PKI on 
X.509 certificates.45 Part of its work is dedicated to developing certification 
protocols for use in legal contexts, such as so-called qualified certificates.  
The self-regulatory approach based on basic legal principles was, e.g., put 
forward by the Internet Law & Policy Forum (ILPF).46 ILPF is an international 
forum of market parties, which amongst others develops principles and policies 
for global use to accelerate the growth of electronic commerce and Internet 
transactions. The Digital Signature Working Group has drafted a set of 
legislative principles for electronic authentication, which "are intended to facilitate 
the creation of a predictable legal environment for electronic commerce based on 
recognition of electronic authentication of signatures and records."47 The approach 
taken by ILPF is technology-neutral and market-driven. 
 
Another approach to regulation is when private sector and government join 
forces and share the regulatory role. This is called co-regulation. Co-regulation 
goes further than what is called conditioned self-regulation, where governments 
set a framework for further elaboration by the private sector. Examples of co-
                                                   
44 See <http://www.ietf.org>.  
45Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix), 29 September 1999, 
<http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/pkix-charter.html>. 
46 See <http://www.ilpf.org>. 
47 See <http://www.ilpf.org/digsig/principles.htm>. 
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regulation are codes of practice developed by industry in consultation with the 
government.48 For instance, the Electronic Commerce Platform in the 
Netherlands (ECP.NL) has drafted a Code of Conduct for Electronic 
Commerce and is at the same time involved in the TTP.NL project. 49 Both the 
Code and the TTP.NL project involve consultation between industry, 
government and interest groups (e.g. the Consumer Association).50 Another 
illustration of this approach is the Code of Practice51 drafted by the Australian 
Internet Industry Association (IIA).52 The Code of Practice is a result of 
ongoing consultations with the Australian government, industry and consumer 
groups.  
 
Each of the aforementioned regulatory approaches has to be valued properly. 
Self-regulation is advocated strongly where Internet regulation is concerned for 
various reasons. First, self-regulation allows for flexibly anticipating 
technological developments. Second, industry and user groups will in some 
instances be better capable of generating (legal) solutions. Finally, self-regulation 
is not confined to geographical borders.53  
Government regulation, on the other hand, is characterised as inflexible, 
national, slow and obsolete before even being operational and not always 
realistic where market and technological developments are concerned.54 
However, in some areas government regulation is important, because 
fundamental standards are concerned, e.g., fundamental rights (such as privacy 
protection), consumer protection and law enforcement. Ideally, governments 
should attempt to approach these fundamental issues internationally, however, 
this will not always be easy due to cultural differences between countries.  
Co-regulation is a way of balancing government regulation and self-regulation 
and, thus, profiting of advantages on either side.55 Both the legislative powers of 
the government and the involvement of industry in fashioning the legal 
environment of e-commerce are respected. With both co-regulation and 
conditioned self-regulation the importance of fundamental standards can be 
                                                   
48 Australia (1997). 
49 See <http://www.ecp.nl>. On the Code of Conduct for Electronic Commerce see: The EDI 
Law Review 6: 73-122, 1999. 
50 See for information on both projects <http://www.ecp.nl/vertrouwen/> (in Dutch). Code of 
Conduct for electronic commerce, Draft version 2.0, 
 <http://www.ecp.nl/vertrouwen/Ecode2-0.zip>. 
51 See <http://www.iia.net.au/code.html>. 
52 See <http://www.iia.net.au/>. 
53 Heineman (1999), p. 153. 
54 See, for instance, ILPF report (1998). 
55 It seems likely that cultural differences may have an impact on the possibility and 
effectiveness of co-regulation. It is, for instance, important that the government is trusted 
sufficiently to be regarded as a valuable partner by industry and other interest groups. 
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respected and at the same time there is the advantage of the flexibility of self-
regulation mechanisms.  
 
As regards electronic authentication the emphasis is still largely on government 
regulation, although some self-regulation or co-regulation initiatives unfolded as 
well (e.g. ILPF Principles, ECP.NL Code of Conduct and TTP.NL). Since 
electronic authentication is a technologically dynamic field with need for a 
flexible and international approach on the one hand, but on the other hand 
affects fundamental standards in most legal systems, perhaps a more combined 
approach should be opted for. Electronic authentication is a complex matter 
and much of the knowledge concerning techniques involved as well as market 
and technological developments is to be found in the business and research field 
rather than with government officials. It is, therefore, of great importance that 
these experts are involved in the regulatory process. These developments, 
furthermore, should not be hampered by premature and unrealistic government 
regulation. Moreover, electronic commerce, electronic authentication being a 
part of that, raises cross-border issues, which should ideally be dealt with from 
an international perspective. At the same time, electronic authentication raises 
some fundamental questions, which ask for direct government regulation. For 
one thing, legal requirements of form cannot always be circumvented by 
contract and need to be addressed by the government. The implementation of 
biometrics also raises questions of a fundamental nature.56 
All in all, both self-regulation and government regulation are relevant tools to 
deal with electronic authentication. Ideally, industry should be in close 
consultation with the government when drafting self-regulation (co-regulation) 
and the government should work closely together with technology and market 
experts when adapting legislation to electronic commerce. How to shift the 
focus that is now mainly on government regulation more in the direction of self-
regulation and co-regulation is still a matter for further consideration and 
research.  
                                                   
56 See, e.g. Van Kralingen, Prins & Grijpink (1997), p. 23-39, on biometrics in relation to 
fundamental rights. 
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3. Approaches in electronic 
authentication legislation 
3.1 Introduction 
Requirements for electronic authentication have already been set forth in 
numerous regulatory initiatives and legislative measures in order to provide legal 
security and encourage the use of these technologies for electronic commerce 
purposes. On an international level, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have released, or are working on, rules with respect to 
electronic authentication. In Europe, the European Union (EU) and several 
countries, such as Germany and Italy have issued (draft) legislation. The same is 
true for many U.S. States, for countries in Asia (Malaysia, Singapore) and South 
America (Argentina, Columbia), and Australia.57 
 
This chapter aims to shed light on the recent developments in electronic and 
digital-signature legislation approaches. We will identify, illustrate and analyse 
different approaches in electronic authentication regulatory initiatives. 
3.2 Legislative approaches toward electronic authentication  
Classifying the existing legislation with respect to electronic authentication is not 
an easy task on account of the many differences that exist. It is, however, 
possible to sketch the main approaches at a national and international level.  
                                                   
57 Digital Signature Law Survey (1999). See also ILPF: Digital Signature Working Group, 
<http://www.ilpf.org/digsig/digsig.htm>. 
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Three approaches can be identified:  
1) The digital signature approach 
2) The two-prong approach 
3) The minimalist approach 
3.2.1 The digital signature approach 
The digital signature approach is characterised by its focus on the digital 
signature technique. Legislation under this category is truly digital signature 
legislation because it regulates (on the basis of) digital signatures. Digital 
signature legislation is technology-specific legislation by definition.  
 
Legislation under the digital signature approach is solely concerned with the 
(evidentiary) status of the digital signature. The digital signature approach knows 
three variations, which we have distinguished as follows: 
 
1) The technical variant 
2) The legal variant 
3) The organisational variant 
3.2.1.1 Technical variant 
The technical approach amounts to setting the digital signature technique as a 
technical standard by means of a legal instrument. The technical approach does 
not deal with legal consequences, although such consequences may implicitly 
follow from the use of digital signatures in accordance with the law concerned.  
 
An illustration of the technical variant is the German Digital Signature Law. 
Germany was one of the first countries in the world to enact a comprehensive 
digital signature law with special technical requirements for a system where 
security is based upon a PKI infrastructure.58 The aim of the German legislator 
as regards the digital signature law was to provide a safe and secure 
infrastructure for the use of signatures in order to let electronic commerce 
flourish. 
The requirements for the digital signature standard are determined in the 
Signature Ordinance (Signaturverordnung) and a Technical Catalogue 
(Massnahmenkatalog).59 The standard will cover the technology of the digital 
signature, but simply and solely as far as the authentication function is 
concerned. Other functions do not fall under the technical standard. Moreover, 
                                                   
58 Kuner (1998), p.712. 
59 Roßnagel (1997), p.75. 
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no explicit legal consequences derive from the German law as regards the use of 
this standard. 60 
The question is whether Germany’s trailblazer role will yield an inspiring model. 
According to Dumortier & Van Eecke, the German government has caused 
total confusion by using a legal instrument to set a technical standard.61 The 
digital signature law establishes a security standard for the specific digital 
signature technique. The German government should rather have left the 
establishment of a standard to the appropriate organisations, such as the 
Bundesamt für Informationssicherheit (Federal Agency for Information 
Security).62 Moreover, the digital signature law is not imperative law and digital 
signatures will not be legally recognised even if the law would be imperative. 
The heavy requirements set by the German law are a drawback, which may 
cause Germany to fall behind rather than make their anticipated pioneering role 
as far as e-commerce is concerned come true. These requirements are a direct 
result of the high reliability requirements set by German legislation with respect 
to legal requirements of form (see 2.4).63 
3.2.1.2 Legal variant 
The legal variant of the digital-signature approach is found in legislation, which 
specifically regulates digital signatures in order to provide this technique with a 
legal status similar to that of the hand-written signature. The general purpose of 
these laws is to provide legal security for the use of digital signatures. Often 
legislation of this kind also includes the implementation and regulation of a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In the next sections, two examples of the legal 
variant will be presented:  
1) the Utah Digital Signature Act, and 
2) the Italian Digital Document Regulations.  
3.2.1.2.1 Utah  
A Common Law example of the legal variant of the digital signature approach is 
the Utah Digital Signature Act of 1995, which aims at facilitating the digital-
                                                   
60 The German Ministry of Justice is, however, in the process of examining existing laws in order 
to improve the legal status of electronic signatures. See also Entwurf eines Gesetzes über 
den Elektronischen Rechtsverkehr, (Draft law on electronic judicial 
matters),Bundesnotarkammer, 29 April 1998, on-line available at: 
 < http://www.bnotk.de/geselrev.htm>. 
61 Dumortier (1998), p. 2-3. Another example of a government technical standard is the US 
Digital Signature Standard (DDS), <http://www.epic.org/crypto/dss/>, which has however 
not been put forward by means of legislation.  
62 Dumortier & Van Eecke (1999a), p. 6. 
63 See also Schulzki-Haddouti (1999). 
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signature technique through detailed regulations.64 The Utah Act sets rules, 
which seem to have a technology-neutral character at first sight. However, it 
actually deals with asymmetric cryptography and maintains existing legislation 
addressing signatures, such as requirements of form, as much as possible. Due 
to the fact that the Utah Digital Signature Act is very explicit about the digital 
signature technology by specifically regulating signatures based upon asymmetric 
encryption, it is also known as “thick” law.65 Under the Utah Act, a digital 
signature will have the same legal effect as a hand-written signature, under the 
condition that all the requirements in the Act are met. 
According to Van Esch, the Utah Act insufficiently takes into account the 
various functions of the signature, which often form the basis for legal 
requirements of form.66 However, as mentioned before one must take into 
account the legal system from which legislation originates. Utah is a Common 
Law system, which generally has more liberal requirements for the use of 
signatures. Expressing one’s intention on a particular matter, electronically or 
otherwise, may be sufficient to assume that a person has “signed". The 
admissibility of electronic signatures as evidence in court, however, poses 
problems, which is the main reason for U.S. governments to issue legislation 
(see 2.4.). Distinguishing between the (other) functions of requirements of form 
is, therefore, less obvious here than in Civil Law systems. 
3.2.1.2.2 Italy 
A Civil Law example of the legal variant of the digital signature approach is the 
Italian Digital Document Regulations of 10 November 1997 (Presidential 
Decree No.513). The regulations elaborate on article 15 of Law No. 59 of 15 
March 1997, which deals with the simplification of public administration. Article 
15 allows the use electronic documents in public administration. Moreover, 
technical rules for digital signatures have been adopted in April 1999, which 
further implement Law No. 59 by, amongst others, prescribing the techniques 
to be used and determining obligations of key holders and CAs.67 
The Digital Document Regulations provide legal recognition of digital 
documents, digital signatures, digital contracts and digital payments. With 
respect to signatures, digital signatures can under certain conditions be used as 
an equivalent to hand-written signatures, seals, embossing, stamps, signs and 
marks of any kind. These conditions include the use of certification services by a 
CA. The requirements, which companies have to fulfil in order to become a CA 
                                                   
64 Utah Digital Signature Act (Utah Code §§ 46-3-101 et seq. (1996) 
<http://www.commerce.state.ut.us/web/commerce/digsig/act.htm>. 
65 Tikwart (1998). 
66 Van Esch (1999), p.190. 
67 Digital Signature Law Survey (1999). 
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are very strict, in the sense that only joint-stock companies with large capital 
(comparable to companies in the financial sector) are allowed to provide these 
services.68  
Italian legislation on electronic authentication clearly illustrates the technology-
specific way of dealing with legal requirements of form.69 The regulations put 
forward the PKI system and are limited to public-key cryptography, i.e., digital 
signatures.70  
3.2.1.3 Organisational variant 
The organisational variant of the digital signature approach, neither sets the 
digital signature as a technical standard nor provides for explicit legal 
recognition of the digital signature, but addresses the organisation of CAs and 
the use of digital certificates in connection with digital signature applications. 
The aim is to promote trust and reliability in electronic transactions by ensuring 
that CAs are reliable and secure. 
 
One example of this variant is the CA-guidelines in Japan, which have been 
issued by the CA Working Group of the Electronic Commerce Promotion 
Council of Japan.71 The Guidelines present guidance to companies, which 
operate as a CA, by providing detailed management requirements, operation 
requirements, and system and facility requirements. The Guidelines focus 
primarily on open user groups, but may also provide guidance for closed 
systems. 
 
Another example is the Dutch National TTP Project, which will amount to 
preconditions for the commercial exploitation of Trusted Third Parties in the 
Netherlands. At present, the implementation of the EU Directive on Electronic 
Signatures (see paragraph 3.2.2.2) is anticipated under the TTP.NL framework. 
3.2.1.4 Synthesis 
All of the initiatives under the digital signature approach are of a national 
character and, with the exception of the Italian legislation, they are all early 
regulations. Along with their focus on digital signatures, these regulations aim at 
the establishment of Public Key Infrastructure in order to ensure, inter alia, that 
the digital signature can fulfil its identification and authentication functions in a 
reliable way. This is, however, as far as the similarity goes, for the binding 
character as well as the goal and effects of these initiatives differ.  
                                                   
68 Digital Signature Law Survey (1999). 
69 Cerina (1998), p.193-9. 
70 IVIR (1998), p. 23. 
71 CA Guidelines, Version 1.0, <http://ecom.ecom.or.jp/ecom_e/cag-smry.htm>. 
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The German, Italian and Utah Act are “real” legislation and have a binding 
effect upon parties concerned (hard law), whereas the Japanese guidelines and 
the framework of TTP.NL merely provide guidance to companies (soft law).  
The objective and, therefore, the effect of the examples provided differ in that 
the German and Japanese regulations as well as TTP.NL, unlike the Italian and 
Utah laws, do not (explicitly) provide legal consequences regarding the use of 
digital signatures.72 Compared to its Italian and Utah counterparts, the German 
law is, therefore, a strange kind of legislation in that a legal instrument is used to 
set technical standards and legal consequences are left to be dealt with at a later 
stage.  
The similarity between the Utah and Italian approaches is strange from the 
viewpoint that Utah has a Common Law system whereas Italy is Civil Law 
country. The legal variant of the digital signature approach seems more 
appropriate for Common Law systems than for Civil Law systems, since it 
merely deals with the evidentiary function of signatures and does not take into 
account the other functions (e.g., protection of weaker parties) a signature may 
serve as well. From the point of view of guaranteeing high reliability, which was 
an important consideration of the German legislator, it is, however, not 
surprising that the Italian legislator has chosen the digital signature approach. In 
the light of more recent legislative initiatives, this approach seems, however, to 
be outdated.  
3.2.2 The two-prong approach 
The second approach is called the two-prong approach, because of its hybrid 
way of dealing with electronic authentication. In this approach, legislators aim at 
making their legislation more time-resistant by, on the one hand, addressing 
certain technological requirements in their legislation and, on the other hand, by 
leaving room for new technological developments. With this approach, 
legislation sets requirements for electronic authentication methods, which will 
receive a certain minimum legal status (minimum prong) and assigns greater 
legal effect to certain electronic-authentication techniques (maximum prong). 
The technologies assigned with this higher legal status are referred to as secure 
electronic signatures.  
 
The maximum prong is similar to the way the digital signature approach in its 
second variation (rendering legal effect to the use digital signatures) is dealing 
with the signature issue. Both the digital-signature and the maximum prong of 
the two-prong approach set detailed regulations addressing, e.g., the rights and 
                                                   
72 This may however be different for TTP.NL, if the EU E-signatures Directive is actually going to 
be implemented within the TTP.NL framework (see paragraph 3.2.1.3). 
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duties of parties concerned and liability allocation between these parties as well 
as requiring the establishment of a PKI. In contrast with the digital-signature 
approach, the two-prong approach does not specify one technology (the digital 
signature) but leaves room for future technologies to comply with the extra 
requirements as well. At present, however, solely the digital-signature technique 
will be protected under the maximum prong. 
The minimum prong is similar to the minimalist approach (see 3.2.3.) and by 
definition leaves room for new technological developments. 
 
In order to illustrate this approach, we will elaborate on three examples: 
1) The UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures (section 
3.2.2.1) 
2) The 1999 EU Directive on Electronic Signatures (section 3.2.2.2) 
3) The 1998 Singapore Electronic Transactions Act (section 3.2.2.3) 
3.2.2.1 UNCITRAL 
On the international level the two-prong approach has been introduced in the 
UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures.73 The Uniform 
Rules, when adopted, are not binding legislation, but give guidance to 
governments and legislative authorities that are preparing legislation on 
electronic signature issues.  
The Uniform Rules have been drafted by the UNCITRAL Working Group on 
Electronic Commerce from the point of view that harmonisation of the law in 
the field of digital signatures and closely related matters (e.g., PKI) is necessary. 
At the same time, the Uniform Rules “should be consistent with the media-neutral 
approach taken in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce” (see 3.2.3.1.) 
and “not discourage the use of other authentication techniques.”74  
 
The Working Group seems to perceive the Uniform Rules as an intermediate 
phase, for it has expressed the intention to “develop a fully media-neutral rule at a 
later stage” with respect to the PKI-model.75 For the time being, the Uniform 
Rules will, however, focus on currently used (or rather known) technology, such 
as digital signatures and PKI. To still leave room for new developments and in 
order not to detract from its technology-neutrality aim, the Working Group has 
explicitly included a reference to article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
                                                   
73 UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules (1999). 
74 UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules (1999), p. 2, No. 3. 
75 UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules (1999), p. 4, No. 8. 
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Electronic Commerce.76 Both regulations, however, constitute separate legal 
instruments.77  
 
Under the current version of the Draft Uniform Rules, ‘electronic signature’ is 
defined as:  
 
“[Data in electronic form in, affixed to, or logically associated with a data message 
and] [any method in relation to a data message] that may be used to identify the 
signature holder in relation to a data message and indicate the signature holder’s 
approval of the information contained in the data message”. 
 
‘Enhanced electronic signature’ means: 
 
“Electronic signature in respect of which it can be shown, through the use of [security 
procedure] [method], that the signature: 
(i) is unique to the signature holder [for the purpose for] [within the context in] which it 
is used; 
(ii) was created and affixed to the data message by the signature holder or using a 
means under the sole control of the signature holder [and not by any other person]; 
(iii) [was created and is linked to the data message to which it relates in a manner 
which provides reliable assurance as to the integrity of the message]”.78 
 
The draft does not provide a definition of ‘digital signature’ as such, but it seems 
clear from the above-cited text that the concept is included in the definition of 
‘enhanced electronic signature’ (see under (iii)). 
The Draft Uniform Rules provide that where an enhanced electronic signature 
is used, there is a presumption that the data message is legally signed. 
3.2.2.2 EU 
Another illustration of the two-prong approach is the Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a Common Framework for Electronic 
Signatures.79 The Directive was drafted for the purpose of creating a 
                                                   
76 Article 2 of the Draft Uniform Rules states: “The provisions of these Rules shall not be applied so as 
to exclude, restrict, or deprive of legal effect any method [of signature] that satisfies the requirements of 
[article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce]". See further: article 6 and 7 of 
the Draft Uniform Rules. 
77 UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules (1999), p. 5, No. 16. 
78 The brackets indicate changes from earlier versions or issues, which are still under 
discussion, see Remarks, UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules (1999), p. 8. 
79 European Parliament and Council Directive on a common framework for electronic signatures,  
<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/dat/2000/l_013/l_01320000119en00120020.pdf>. On this 
Directive see also: Kuner (1998), FIPR (1999) and Schulzki-Haddouti (1999). 
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harmonised legal framework for electronic signatures in the European Union. 
Currently, several EU Member States have issued or are planning to issue 
electronic authentication legislation, which may impede the development of 
electronic commerce due to their divergence.  
The Directive starts off with a major and unfortunate limitation: it does not 
cover the legal recognition of electronic signatures related to the conclusion and 
validity of contracts or other non-contractual formalities requiring signatures 
(article 1). The Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on 
certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market80 does deal 
with the legal validity of electronic contracts (article 9), yet it does not affect 
signature requirements, since they are already covered by the Signature 
Directive. Thus, the EU Directive on electronic signatures will have confined 
significance. 
 
The Commission supports a technology-neutral approach towards electronic 
authentication legislation, in an effort to ensure that the Directive will not 
become obsolete as technology and society progress. The explanatory 
memorandum of the draft directive formulated it as follows:  
 
“While there is much discussion and work on digital signature technologies which 
employ public-key cryptography, a Directive at the European level should be 
technology-neutral and should not focus only on these kinds of signatures. Since a 
variety of authentication mechanisms is expected to develop, the scope of this 
Directive should be broad enough to cover a spectrum of “electronic signatures”, 
which would include digital signatures based on public-key cryptography as well as 
other means of authenticating data”. 
 
The Directive does not limit the recognition of signatures to those created using 
a specific type of technology, indeed it uses the general expression ‘electronic 
signatures’, which is defined as: 
 
“Data in electronic form attached to, or logically associated with, other electronic data 
and which serves as a method of authentication.” 
 
Similar to UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules, the Directive takes a hybrid 
approach in order to differentiate between different possible levels of reliability. 
The Directive therefore provides special legal consequences with respect to 
                                                   
80 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of 
electronic commerce in the internal market, on-line available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/eleccomm/com586en.pdf>. 
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evidential issues to advanced electronic signatures. 'Advanced electronic 
signature' means: 
 
"Electronic signature which meets the following requirements: 
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory,  
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory,  
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control, 
and  
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent 
change of the data is detectable."81 
 
Sub (d) strongly relates to digital signatures and even though the EU Directive 
may leave room for future technologies to fulfil the rather high requirements of 
advanced electronic signatures, at present it seems particularly focussed upon 
the digital-signature technique. 
3.2.2.3 Singapore 
An example of the two-prong approach at a national level is the 1998 Singapore 
Electronic Transactions Act, which, inter alia, deals with liability of ISPs, 
electronic contracts, electronic records and electronic authentication.82 
With respect to signing requirements,83 the Act first generally states that an 
electronic signature may not be denied legal effect. ‘Electronic signature’ means: 
 
“Any letters, characters, numbers or other symbols in digital form attached to or 
logically associated with an electronic record, and executed or adopted with the 
intention of authenticating or approving the electronic record.” 
 
Subsequently, special evidentiary presumptions are provided for secure 
electronic signatures, which are signatures made through an application of a 
                                                   
81Annex I determines that a qualified certificate contains the following: (a) the identifier of the 
certification service provider issuing it; (b) the unmistakable name of the holder or an unmistakable 
pseudonym which shall be identified as such; (c) a specific attribute of the holder such as, the address, 
the authority to act on behalf of a company the credit-worthiness, VAT or other tax registration numbers 
the existence of payment guarantees or specific permits or licences; (d) a signature verification device 
which corresponds to a signature creation device under the control of the holder; (e) beginning and end 
of the operational period of the certificate; (f) the unique identity code of the certificate; (g) the electronic 
signature of the certification service provider issuing it; (h) limitations on the scope of use of the 
certificate, if applicable; and (I) limitations on the certification service provider’s liability and on the value 
of transactions for which the certificate is valid, if applicable.” 
82 The Act is available from the Singapore Electronic Commerce Policy Page,  
<http://www.ec.gov.sg/policy.html>. 
83 Note that some provisions with legal requirements of form (e.g. will, negotiable documents, 
sale of immovable property) are excluded from this Act, see: Article 4. 
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prescribed security procedure or a commercially reasonable secure procedure. A 
‘security procedure’ being defined as  
 
“a procedure for the purpose of (a) verifying that an electronic record is that of a 
specific person; or (b) detecting error or alteration in the communication content or 
storage of an electronic record since a specific point in time, which may require the 
use of algorithms or codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, answerback or 
acknowledgement procedures, or similar security devices”.  
 
In addition, the Act requires a secure electronic signature to be:  
 
“(a) unique to the person using it; (b) capable of identifying such a person; (c) created 
in a manner or using a means under the sole control of the person using it; and (d) is 
linked to the electronic record to which it relates in a manner such that if the record 
was changed the electronic signature would be invalidated”. 
 
Although at present these requirements will particularly be fulfilled by digital 
signatures, the Act leaves room for other (new) applications, which may fulfil 
these requirements as well by explicitly mentioning other techniques in its 
definition of ‘security procedure’ and addressing (secure) digital signatures in 
Part VI of the Act. The digital signature is deemed a secure electronic signature 
if it is created in connection with a CA-procedure, which is in conformity with 
the rules set out in the Act.  
3.2.2.4 Synthesis 
Initiatives under the two-prong approach can be found at every level, the 
international, European and national level, and are generally of a recent date. In 
fact, there seems a tendency away from the digital signature approach towards a 
combination of digital and electronic signature legislation. All three (draft) 
regulations differentiate between electronic signatures and enhanced electronic 
signatures (though they use different terms for the latter), whereby enhanced 
electronic signatures especially (and at present exclusively) concern digital 
signatures. In this way, these initiatives aim at uniting the advantages of 
technology-neutral and technology-dependent legislation. Only the Singapore 
Act deals with requirements of form in an integral way by addressing both 
writings and signatures. The UNCITRAL Draft Uniform Rules merely deals 
with signatures, but there are cross-references (as far as signatures are 
concerned) to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce dealing 
with formal requirements. However, the relationship between the Uniform 
Rules and the Model Law is not completely clear. Nor is it clear whether the 
Uniform Rules add something to the Model Law. From the Introduction to the 
Draft Uniform Rules, one can tell there has been a debate on the necessity of 
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the Rules, the widely prevailing view, however, was to continue work on these 
Rules.84 Another restriction in both the Uniform Rules and the Model Law is 
their confinement to commercial contracts. The EU Directive addresses 
signature requirements but at the same time excludes the issue of the validity 
and conclusion of contracts from its scope. The latter subject is dealt with in the 
proposed E-commerce Directive and in its turn does not address signatures, 
because these will be regulated under the Electronic Signatures Directive. This 
twisted way of dealing with requirements of form may well be the result of 
difficulties the European Commission faced in trying to unite the divergent 
views of the EU Member States.85 
The UNCITRAL Uniform Rules seem to take into account the functional 
approach (see section 2.3.3.) already adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which leaves room for different legal systems to apply the rules.86 The Singapore 
Act takes more of a Common Law approach towards electronic signatures, in 
that it does not so much address the purpose of signing as the fact that a 
signature shows the signer’s expression of approval of the electronic declaration. 
In comparison with the other two examples, the EU Directive takes a rather 
restricted approach toward electronic signatures by merely providing certain 
reasons on the basis of which these signatures may not be denied legal effect.  
The aforementioned shows that within the two-prong approach the regulations 
may still be very different, due to policy and other considerations as well as the 
legal system these initiatives originate from. These differences, unfortunately, do 
not contribute to transparency in the field of electronic authentication 
legislation. 
3.2.3 The minimalist approach 
The minimalist approach is a minimal way of regulating electronic 
authentication methods. This kind of legislation does not address specific 
techniques and, therefore, intends to be technology-neutral. In this approach, 
legislation relates to the functions, which signatures may have to fulfil in trade, 
and the different levels of reliability with respect to the purposes signatures are 
used for. Because this approach’s main focus is on the relevant functions of 
signatures and the ways in which these functions may be translated into 
technological applications, it is also called the functionalist approach. Within the 
minimalist approach, the focus on functions of signatures (and writings) can be 
more or less explicit. Both the UNCITRAL Model on Electronic Commerce 
                                                   
84 Draft Uniform Rules on electronic signatures, A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.82, 29 June 1999, no. 7 and 
8. 
85 See Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 149 and Schulzki-Haddouti (1999). 
86 See, for instance, articles 3 and 6 of the Draft Uniform Rules. 
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(see paragraph 3.3.1.1) and the draft Electronic Commerce Framework Bill (see 
paragraph 3.3.1.2) of the Victorian government generally leave room to take into 
account these different functions. None the less, they do not give full review of 
legal requirements of form to identify functions and translate these into the 
electronic environment. In this respect, the approach taken in the Model Law 
and the draft Bill differs from the approach proposed by Huydecoper/Van 
Esch, which would call for systematic analysis of existing legal requirements of 
form and the considerations behind them.   
3.2.3.1 UNCITRAL 
One of the first regulatory initiatives with respect to electronic authentication, 
which embraces the minimalist approach, is the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce.87 The UNCITRAL has adopted this Model Law under its 
mandate to promote the progressive harmonisation and unification of 
international trade law. The Model Law offers national legislators a set of 
internationally recognised rules as to how a number of legal obstacles may be 
removed and a more secure legal environment for electronic commerce could 
be achieved.88 The Model Law is not a binding law, but an example for national 
legislators of how to deal with, inter alia, legal requirements of form in an 
electronic environment. 
The Model Law, as a framework law, does not set forth all the rules and 
regulations that may be necessary to implement those techniques in particular 
country.89 Countries that want to implement an act on this subject should 
supplement the Model Law with technical regulations to fill in this framework 
observing the Model Law’s objectives. Although the Model law does not 
explicitly refer to industry self-regulation and co-regulation, one might assume 
that technical regulations can also be implemented using these regulatory 
instruments. 
The terminology, which is used in the Model Law, is open and broad. Thus, the 
UNCITRAL aims at providing a Model Law, which is acceptable for countries 
with different legal systems, by leaving room for variation, while ensuring that 
some barriers to electronic commerce can be effectively removed. At the same 
time, the UNCITRAL avoids putting forward certain technologies and provides 
a scheme, which starts from functions of signatures instead of from 
technological functionality.90 
                                                   
87On-line available at <http://www.uncitral.org>. 
88
UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 2.  
89
UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), p.14. 
90UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 55: “[A]ny attempt to develop rules on standards and procedures to 
be used as substitutes for specific instances of “signatures” might create the risk of tying the legal 
framework provided by the Model Law to a given state of technical development.” 
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The minimalist approach, which is called functional-equivalent approach by the 
Model Law, chosen by the UNCITRAL aims at adjusting national legislation to 
ICT developments while leaving legal requirements of form and legal concepts 
underlying those requirements intact. The functions and purposes of these 
requirements is the point of departure and the Model Law provides criteria for 
fulfilling these purposes and functions by means of technology.91 
 
Article 7 of the Model Law deals with signatures. This article states: 
 
“(1) Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation 
to a data message if:  
(a) a method is used to identify that person and to indicate that person's approval of 
the information contained in the data message; and  
(b) that method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data 
message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, 
including any relevant agreement.  
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an 
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the absence of a 
signature.  
(3) The provisions of this article do not apply to the following: […]92.” 
  
Paragraph 1 subsection (a) provides the basic legal functions of a signature, 
which in combination with subsection (b) may be extended to other functions 
necessary under certain legal provisions. The Guide of Enactment of the Model 
Law identifies several (legal, technical and commercial) factors, which may be 
taken into account to determine whether the method used was appropriate 
under paragraph 1: 
 
“(1) the sophistication of the equipment used by each of the parties; 
(2) the nature of their trade activity;  
(3) the frequency at which commercial transactions take place between the parties;  
(4) the kind and size of the transaction;  
(5) the function of signature requirements in a given statutory and regulatory 
environment; 
(6) the capability of communication systems;  
(7) compliance with authentication procedures set forth by intermediaries;  
                                                   
91UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 18: “The Model Law does not attempt to define a computer-based 
equivalent to any kind of paper document. Instead, it singles out basic functions of paper-based form 
requirements, with a view to providing criteria which, once they are met by data messages, enable such 
data messages to enjoy the same level of legal recognition as corresponding paper documents 
performing the same function.”  
92 National legislators may fill in the exceptions. 
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(8) the range of authentication procedures made available by any intermediary;  
(9) compliance with trade customs and practice;  
(10) the existence of insurance coverage mechanisms against unauthorized 
messages;  
(11) the importance and the value of the information contained in the data message;  
(12) the availability of alternative methods of identification and the cost of 
implementation;  
(13) the degree of acceptance or non-acceptance of the method of identification in the 
relevant industry or field both at the time the method was agreed upon and the time 
when the data message was communicated; and any other relevant factor.”93 
 
Paragraph 3 leaves room for exclusions, for instance, contracts for which 
governments would like to maintain the traditional requirements of form, such 
as paper documents and hand-written signatures.  
Article 7 does not stand on its own and must be applied in combination with 
articles 6 (writing) and 8 (original), which also embrace the functional-equivalent 
approach:94 
 
“When adopting the “functional-equivalent” approach, attention was given to the 
existing hierarchy of form requirements, which provides distinct levels of reliability, 
traceability and unalterability with respect to paper-based documents. For example, 
the requirement that data be presented in written form (which constitutes a “threshold 
requirement”) is not to be confused with more stringent requirements such as “signed 
writing”, “signed original” or “authenticated legal act.”95 
3.2.3.2 Victoria (Australia) 
Another illustration of the minimalist approach is the draft Electronic 
Commerce Framework Bill of the State Government of Victoria.96 In this Bill, 
Victoria embraces the minimalist approach of the UNCITRAL Model on 
Electronic Commerce. 
 
The Bill defines ‘electronic signature’ as: 
 
“the result of a process applied by the person to a document in electronic form by 
which – 
• the person authenticates the document and 
                                                   
93 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 58. 
94 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 47. 
95 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 17. 
96 Electronic Commerce Framework Bill, Department of State Development, State Government 
of Victoria, Australia, December 1998,  
<http://www.vic.gov.au/stategov/ecfbp&b.pdf>. 
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• acknowledges that the document is being signed.” 
 
In section 5, the Bill states with respect to signatures: 
 
"(1) A person may use an electronic signature for any purpose for which a signature is 
required or permitted by law. 
(2) The effect of an electronic signature is the same for the purposes of any law as 
that of a manual signature. 
(3)This section -- 
(a) applies despite any provision to the contrary made by the particular law; 
(b) does not apply in relation to a particular transaction if the parties to that transaction 
otherwise agree or any of those parties reasonably requires a method of signing other 
than by electronic signature; 
(c) does not apply to the extent to which its operation is excluded by section 8 in the 
case of a particular law.” 
 
The exclusions in section 8 concern, inter alia, testamentary instruments, trust, 
powers of attorney, court documents and documents concerning an interest in 
real property. The Governor in Council, moreover, has the authority to issue 
regulations, which prescribe additional exclusions or exempt laws from section 
8. In addition, the Governor can issue regulations, which, if necessary, provide 
further elaboration on the part of the Bill concerned with legal requirements of 
form.97  
 
The Victorian government is of the opinion that the private sector should lead 
and will, therefore, encourage the development of guidelines, codes and 
standards in the private sector. The Minister may approve initiatives of the 
private sector resulting in organisations and codes, which can provide guidance 
to participants in electronic commerce or facilitate electronic commerce, by 
notice published in the Government Gazette.98  
3.2.3.3 Synthesis 
The Victorian draft law is one of the most recent initiatives, which falls back on 
one of the first initiatives, namely the UNCITRAL Model Law, in the field of 
electronic authentication. This makes it seems as we are back to square one.  
The approach taken in the UNCITRAL Model Law is truly international in 
attempting to leave room for different elaboration by national legislators. An 
example of which is the Victorian draft law. The starting point is the differences 
in legal systems and the wish to accommodate the legal systems. One 
                                                   
97 Section 10. 
98 Section 9. 
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(international and national) step further would be to develop and implement 
international concepts of formal requirements.99 In the short run this does not 
seem feasible: consensus is not likely to be reached easily and, if it is ever 
reached, (national) legislators must go through the difficult process of 
reconsidering and adapting existing concepts in their legislation. 
The minimalist approach taken in the Victorian draft law is very minimal 
compared with the possibilities that the Model Law provides in article 7, 
because it generally equates electronic signatures with manual signatures. The 
draft law leaves room for further elaboration and exclusions from the main rule 
in order to enable variation. The minimal approach taken in the Victorian Bill 
may be due to the low(er) requirements, which signatures may have to meet in 
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Table 3: Approaches in electronic authentication legislation 
3.2.4 Evaluation of the approaches 
Important assumptions on which we have based our conclusions in this 
paragraph are that the market is constantly on the move and we do not know 
what lies ahead as far as technological and e-commerce developments are 
concerned. Therefore, we feel it is unwise to issue detailed regulations and to 
determine specific business models, such as the PKI model, when it is by no 
                                                   
99 See Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 151. 
100 Note that we have not made any inquiries into these requirements in the Australian legal 
system; our remark is a mere presumption based on what we wrote in section 2.4. 
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means clear, whether they turn out to be viable models.101 Viewed in this light, 
the digital signature approach is seriously flawed. Although, the legislators and 
regulators under the digital signature approach may have done so for all the 
right reasons (legal certainty, trustworthiness with respect to legal matters), the 
approach as such is not recommendable. The argument that digital signature 
legislation can offer more legal certainty and security because of its detailed 
character is untenable if such legislation proves to be obsolete or adjustable at 
any given moment: 
  
"There is a growing assumption that existing electronic signature laws will need to be 
revised as the use of certification and electronic signatures expands and electronic 
commerce evolves, supplemented in some areas and streamlined in others. In 
addition, significant redrafting may be necessary if uniform laws are to be 
promulgated among different jurisdictions."102 
 
The same is true, but to a lesser extent for the two-prong approach. The two-
prong approach attempts to skirt around these problems by presenting an 
opening for new technologies besides setting criteria for certain advanced 
electronic signatures, which at present most notably cover digital signatures. The 
approach is understandable in the sense that there seems to be a strong 
inclination to look for clear and trustworthy solutions, while at the same time, 
there is a need to leave room for new solutions. Still, within the two-prong 
approach legislation often deals with issues and situations (e.g., CAs, liability, 
qualities that focus mainly on certain techniques), which have not yet been 
determined and thus, may well need adjustment once they have. In view of this 
situation, it is in our view not sensible at present to ask governments to 
implement PKI or similar models according to detailed rulings. Finally, both the 
digital signature approach and the two-prong approach are in many instances 
focussed too narrowly on signatures as such and not on formal requirements as 
a whole.103 
 
                                                   
101 Moreover, alternative models for traditional PKI are being developed already. See Brands 
(1999), who has developed alternative techniques, which unlike traditional PKI would 
provide privacy protection. Other models have also been developed, for instance, the SDSI 
(Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure) model of the Cryptography and Information 
Security Group Research Project, 
<http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~cis/sdsi.htmlSDSI#>. 
102 Australia (1998), paragraph 3.3.6. See also FIPR (1999), indicating situations and 
technologies, which are presently not covered by the EU Directive on Electronic 
Signatures. 
103 See further paragraph 4.2. 
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As far as we are concerned, we are back to our starting point with the minimalist 
approach taken in the UNCITRAL Model Law still offering the most sensible 
solution to legislators wanting to tackle the problem of formal requirements in 
their legislation. Under this approach, legal requirements of form are generally 
dealt with in their entirety. Moreover, the minimalist approach allows for 
different functions which techniques have to fulfil under national legal systems, 
while creating room for new techniques and adventitious developments. Recent 
legislative initiatives recognise the advantages of the minimalist approach and 
have explicitly taken the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce as 
an example.104 Whereas elaboration of legislation along the lines of the 
minimalist approach will most likely be of a national character, taking national 
considerations into account, it also has the potential to provide an international 
direction for a redefinition of the signature concept and for future uniform 
legislation.105 
 
More detailed, technologically oriented legislation may still be an option when 
markets and technology are more clearly shaped and there is still a need to 
explicitly promote certain solutions. By then, the real problems may be clear 
enough to address them with more specific rules. Currently, the one problem is 
legal uncertainty and where that problem can be settled with a more general 
approach that solution is preferable. In the meantime, governments can take a 
co-operative stance toward international organisations and industry (and vice 
versa) and address subject matters, which are more clearly outlined already. Co-
operation would provide as an additional advantage education of government 
officials with respect to developments in the market, since that aspect often 
leaves much to be desired.106 Considering the need for a flexible and preferably 
international approach, co-regulation could be considered as an instrument to 
effectuate and reflect the co-operation between governments, international 
organisations and industry. The minimalist approach is likely to leave room for 
self-regulatory initiatives.107  
 
                                                   
104 Such as the Victorian draft law (paragraph. 3.3.1.2) and the Canadian the Uniform Electronic 
Commerce Act (UECA) (paragraph 4.4.2.2). 
105 See for a first international attempt the Draft International Convention on Electronic 
Transactions, which the U.S.A. proposed to the UNCITRAL. Available at: 
<http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/wg_ec/wp-77.htm>. 
106 See also Kuner/Miedbrodt (1999), p. 151. 
107 See UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), Nos. 13-14. 
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4. Minimalism: exploring the 
functionalist approach 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous paragraph we have classified and analysed the approaches 
toward electronic authentication regulation. These approaches include the digital 
signature approach, the two-prong approach and the minimalist approach. For 
reasons stated in paragraph 3.2.4, we prefer the minimalist approach as the way 
of addressing legal requirements of form in legislation. The minimalist approach 
does not address technology or certain models, but takes the functions of form 
requirements as the starting point and thus is of a functionalistic character. In 
this chapter we will further explore the minimalist approach by concentrating on 
this particular nature, which we will call functionalism. 
4.2 Functionalism in general 
The central question in the functionalist approach towards legal requirements of 
form is whether electronic signatures can fulfil the same functions as traditional 
signatures and, thus, replace these signatures in an electronic environment. The 
question could even be broadened by looking for a redefinition of the hand-
written signature for electronic environments in order to meet with legal 
requirements of form and their functions. In other words, in what ways can the 
hand-written signature be replaced by digital techniques and still perform the 
same functions the legislator had in mind when including formal requirements 
in the law. The hidden presumption behind the broader question is that other 
techniques, which are not considered electronic signatures, may either in 
combination with or without electronic signature techniques fulfil functions 
behind signature requirements. For instance, some legal requirements intend to 
provide consumer protection by requiring a signed writing. In an electronic 
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environment there may be other means, not perceived as electronic signatures, 
which can fulfil that function as well as for example the general conditions 
appearing in pop-up screens, which need to be explicitly accepted by the 
consumer before he can proceed in the ordering process. 
Further scrutiny of the functionalist approach shows that this approach falls 
into two separate working methods. First, the functionalist approach can be 
carried out by systematically reviewing legal requirements of form in legislation. 
This method involves reassessing every single formal requirement and the 
legislator's considerations as to why the specific formal requirement had to be 
included in legislation. On the basis of the outcome of that examination, the 
status of electronic authentication methods as a replacement for traditional 
signatures must be determined: can the electronic signatures fulfil the functions 
of hand-written signatures for the purpose of compliance with this specific legal 
requirement of form? An example of this approach is the functional-analysis test 
elaborated by Huydecoper/Van Esch.108 Henceforth, called the specific-
functionalist approach. 
The second working method also takes into account the functions of traditional 
signatures and the fulfilment of these functions by electronic authentication 
methods, but does not require a systematic review of national legislation.109 The 
use of electronic means for complying with formal requirements is allowed 
under certain conditions and, if necessary, with certain exceptions. This method 
is followed by the UNCITRAL in the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and 
the Victorian government (Australia) in its draft Electronic Commerce 
Framework Bill (see paragraph 3.2.3). We will call this approach the generic-
functionalist approach.  
4.3 The specific-functionalist approach 
4.3.1 The working of the specific-functionalist approach 
4.3.1.1 General 
A test for the specific-functionalist approach has been worked out in the earlier 
mentioned study by Huydecoper/Van Esch: Writings and Signatures: An Outdated 
                                                   
108 Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997). 
109 Although this approach could be combined with a long-term policy of reviewing the formal 
requirements as well. 
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Concept?.110 This study identified, inter alia, functions of signatures in Dutch 
legislation and developed the functional-analysis test to determine whether 
electronic signatures and electronic documents can comply with formal 
requirements in the same way as hand-written signatures and paper documents 
can.  
 
Huydecoper & Van Esch identified the following functions of signatures with 
respect to Dutch law: 
 
• Identification. The addressee can verify the signer's identity by checking the 
signature.  
• Authentication. The signature authenticates the declaration, which is included 
in the writing concerned. The writing reflects the facts correctly, unless 
evidence to the contrary is produced.  
• Declaration of will. By signing the signer manifests his will and declares to be 
legally bound to the intention included in the writing concerned. 
• Authorisation. The signer implicitly declares being authorised to perform a 
legal act, e.g., in case of representation. 
• Safeguard against undue haste. By putting one's signature to a document the 
signer is notified that legal consequences may be involved. Thus, the signer 
is protected against undue haste.  
• Non-repudiation of origin and/or receipt. The signer cannot deny that he has sent 
or received a document, unless proven otherwise. 
• Notice of contents. The signer implicitly indicates that he knows the contents 
of the document. 
• Integrity. Putting one's signature at the end of the document guarantees to 
some extent that the document has not been altered afterwards, thus, 
reducing the possibility of fraudulent actions. 
• Originality. Signing a document enables to distinguish the original from a 
copy.111 
 
As mentioned earlier, the functions of signatures have to be regarded in 
connection with those attributed to writings. Thus, it is significant to keep these 
                                                   
110 Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997). The title of this earlier study is, however, somewhat 
misleading, since it does not address the question of whether writings and signatures are 
indeed out-of-date concepts. The question is interesting though in the sense that in the 
electronic context there may be far more different ways of performing the functions of 
writings and signatures. Also in some instances electronic communication may not require 
these functions in the same way the paper environment does. See, e.g., Kuner/Miedbrodt 
(1999), p. 13. 
111 Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997), p. 119-23. See also UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 53. 
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functions in mind as well, when actually evaluating formal requirements in the 
light of electronic transactions. 
4.3.1.2 Features 
In their study, Huydecoper & Van Esch proceed to evaluate each function in 
the light of electronic signature techniques after having compared the features 
of hand-written signatures and electronic signatures first.112 The reason why the 
hand-written signature was considered to be an appropriate means to fulfil the 
aforementioned functions is due to certain features of these signatures. Hand-
written signatures are: 
 
(1) Easy to use 
(2) Durable 
(3) Directly discernible 
(4) Individual113   
 
Electronic signatures and other techniques, however, do not in every instance 
display similar qualities.  
 
(1) For users it is not always transparent what actually happens when applying 
electronic signature techniques, for instance, entering a PIN-code or using 
digital signature software, such as Pretty Good Privacy. Even though the 
global functioning of a technique may be clear to some users, the elaborated 
process may still be far too complicated to be fully grasped by most users. 
Electronic signature techniques are certainly far more complicated than 
hand-written signatures and (as yet) not always user-friendly. Apart from a 
lack of transparency and the complexity of the process, the electronic signer 
needs hardware and software to sign instead of merely pen and paper. 
(2) Durability is problematic in an electronic environment. Electronic 
documents and signatures are nothing more than a set of bits & bytes, 
stored in the volatile memory of a computer, on the hard disc of a PC or 
server, or any other (portable) disc. Durability of electronic signatures is, 
thus, strongly dependent on the durability of the medium they are stored 
on, the carefulness of the user and/or owner of that medium and the 
durability of the software that is used.  
(3)  Electronic signatures are not directly discernible. The user needs access to 
hardware and the appropriate software in order to check the signature. 
However, the control process in which the validity of the signature is 
                                                   
112 Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997), p. 118-9. 
113 Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997), p. See also UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 48, with 
respect to writings. 
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checked may, in many instances, probably be quicker and more reliable 
where electronic signatures are concerned.  
(4) Electronic signatures are in principle not individual, meaning that they are 
not inherently linked to a certain person, as is the case of hand-written 
signatures. This may be different as far as certain electronic signatures are 
concerned, that use personal features of the signer, also called biometric 
features, such as fingerprints, iris, pressure and speed of signing (digital 
pen), and the appearance of the signature (scanned signature). Biometric 
techniques do, however, show drawbacks, which are mentioned in the 
following section (paragraph 4.3.1.3).114 
4.3.1.3 Functions 
In pursuance of this comparison of features, the evaluation of functions with 
respect to electronic signature methods, in our opinion, shows the following 
picture.  
With respect to all the functions, the non-individual character of electronic 
signature techniques seems to be the major obstacle. For instance, electronic 
signatures are not appropriate means of identification and authentication by 
themselves, since they lack individuality: they are not inherently connected with 
one individual.115 Thus, electronic signatures need to be used in combination 
with other technical and security measures to be able to fulfil the identification 
function. Many electronic signature regulations, therefore, provide a system of 
digital certificates,116 which may have shortcomings with respect to, e.g. privacy 
implications.117 
In Huydecoper & Van Esch's opinion, biometric identification methods 
“indisputably determine the user's identity”. However, this is stated far too 
easily, since biometrics is certainly not a one hundred percent reliable means of 
identification. This is due to the fact that these methods are based upon 
probabilities, meaning that a certain failure rate exists. Moreover, some 
biometric features are less stable (e.g. dynamic signatures) than others (e.g. iris 
and finger print) and the unique status of several biometric features is still 
disputed. Thus many biometrics applications may seem too unreliable to serve 
                                                   
114 Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997), p. 132-4. 
115 As a result of privacy dangers in electronic communication, the role of identification may 
possibly have to change with respect to electronic transactions. In our view, heavy 
requirements for identification would be unjustified where verification of, e.g., authority is 
sufficient. 
116 For instance, on the basis of a PKI-system, but there are other alternatives as well, e.g., 
SDSI. See on SDSI: <http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~cis/sdsi.html>. See also Brands (1999).  
117 See Brands (1999), who developed techniques that meet privacy requirements. 
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as an authentication means.118 Furthermore, there is the problem of maintaining 
a directory, in which biometrics are linked to persons. Otherwise there is no way 
of knowing whether a biometric feature, e.g. an iris print, attached to a an 
electronic message, belongs to a certain person.119 Finally, there might even be 
objections to biometrics of a more ethical nature, because some of the 
techniques may not (yet) be completely accepted by users.120  
As regards the integrity function of signatures, electronic signature techniques 
will in principle not be the most suitable means in an electronic environment to 
perform this function. Electronic signatures, as electronic documents, are 
merely a collection of bits & bytes, which may in general be easily manipulated. 
An exception is the digital signature, which on the contrary is excellently apt to 
guarantee the integrity of electronic documents.  
An electronic original, strictly speaking, does not exist. Additional technical 
measures will always be necessary to determine and secure certain versions of 
electronic documents. Again digital signature applications may possibly be an 
adequate means to approximate the originality concept especially in combination 
with time-stamping techniques. 
As a result of the lack of experience with electronic-signature techniques, the 
undue-haste and notice-of-contents functions seem not to be fulfilled properly 
by using these techniques. By putting a hand-written signature to a document, 
sometimes in combination with other ceremonial aspects, for instance, 
appearing before a notary public, the signer will most likely be aware that a 
matter of legal importance is about to occur. Electronic-signature techniques, 
however, do not have (as yet) the same connotation and it is by no means 
certain that these techniques will ever have a similar impact, since they do not 
exactly shine in user-friendliness and the underlying technical processes are 
usually not very transparent to the common user.121 
To conclude this paragraph, it is clear that electronic-authentication techniques 
do not necessarily provide alternatives to hand-written signatures in themselves. 
Often additional measures are necessary to adequately fulfil most of the 
functions. 
                                                   
118 Kralingen, Prins & Grijpink (1997), p. 21. Ongoing research on biometrics will, however, 
result in further improvement of these techniques. 
119 Personal communication by John D. Gregory. 
120 Kralingen, Prins & Grijpink (1997), p. 54-55. 
121 There are, however, developments to integrate authentication techniques in software in order 
to contribute to the user-friendliness of these techniques. 
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4.3.2 Proposals for the specific-functionalist approach 
4.3.2.1 The Netherlands: Huls-report 
In 1998, the Dutch Cabinet instructed the Huls-commission122 to examine the 
necessity of existing formal requirements and equivalent electronic alternatives 
for formal requirements where these requirements are still necessary as well as 
conditions for the use of electronic alternatives. 123 The commission carried out 
its investigations on the basis of three examples of formal requirements in 
Dutch law: 
 
(1) Employment contracts; 
(2) Transfer of immovable properties;  
(3) Announcement obligation for administrative decisions.124 
 
The Huls-commission opts for a specific-functionalist approach towards formal 
requirements. This approach would consist of a functional analysis, because 
each formal requirement needs to be checked against the legislator’s 
considerations for implementing the particular formal requirement. The Huls-
commission report elaborates every example on the legislator's reasons for 
implementing the formal requirement in the law and subsequently the 
conditions for performing these formal requirements electronically. With 
respect to each of the aforementioned examples, the commission concludes that 
electronic performance of the formal requirements is possible under certain 
conditions. These conditions (unsurprisingly) focus on the specific functions 
that the formal requirements have to fulfil.  
The Huls-commission indicates three functional distinctions, which the 
legislator should take into account when addressing laws for electronic 
environments.  First, the evidence and communication functions of (electronic) 
documents are important for social acceptance of new techniques. Second, there 
is a difference between open and closed networks. Closed networks are 
confined to a limited number of parties with a certain (contractual) relationship. 
Open networks are publicly accessible. Acceptance of electronic documents is 
sooner expected in a closed environment than in an open one. Thirdly, 
consumers and professionals need to be distinguished. It is important to ensure 
                                                   
122 This commission was named after its chairman Professor Huls. 
123 Startnotitie Elektronisch verrichten van rechtshandelingen, Huls-report (1998), Annex I. 
124These examples have been criticised, because they were found not to be relevant to 
electronic commerce, see Van Esch (1998), p. 303. However, there are already examples 
of on-line legal forms in the field of, e.g., family law, sales, real estate and employment, 
see Matthijssen (1997), p.19-21. 
Digital Signature Blindness 
 50
consumer protection by, for instance, introducing time for reflection as is 
provided by the European Union Directive on Distance Selling.125  
This being considered, the commission addresses the virtues of self-regulation, 
especially in situations where technology is developing and self-organisational 
market forces are at work. The government will often not be able to influence 
these developments, but may still set conditions to structure self-regulatory 
initiatives in the market (conditioned self-regulation). However relevant self-
regulation may be, it is, according to the commission, still important that the 
government issues legislation. Therefore, the Huls-commission proposes to the 
legislator to implement so-called experimental provisions (or in other words: 
trial-and-error provisions) into Dutch law, which allow electronic 
communication where formal requirements exist and set conditions accordingly. 
Test-provisions, being an unknown phenomenon in Dutch law, seem to be the 
result of the commission understanding that something needs to be done with 
respect to requirements of form, but they feel hesitant about actually doing 
anything about it. Communication with the Ministry of Justice revealed that 
meanwhile test-provisions will not be used, due to the wave of criticism about 
this indefinite concept.  
The trial-and-error legislation issue was most certainly raised as a means to 
provide conditions in abstract wordings, which would leave room for self-
regulation and case law to fill in the gaps. These abstract conditions would 
include principles with respect to integrity, transparency, voluntariness, 
confidentiality, availability, protection from undue haste, durability and 
authenticity. The commission does, however, not indicate more concretely what 
these experimental provisions would actually have to be like. 
 
On the one hand, the Huls-commission seems to adhere to the functional-
analysis approach by stating that each formal requirement must expressly be 
analysed concerning their ability to be complied with electronically. On the 
other hand, the Huls-commission takes a more open approach by putting 
forward general principles for formal requirements, while leaving further 
elaboration to self-regulation and case law. As we understand it, the functional 
analysis of formal requirements needs to be performed by the users of 
electronic-communication means as well as by judges, according to the general 
principles the commission put forward. In our opinion, this is an impassable 
road for several reasons. First of all, the functional analysis of formal 
requirements is, as we know from experience,126 a time-consuming and 
                                                   
125Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
Protection of Consumers in respect of Distance Contracts, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24/policy/developments/dist_sell/dist01_en.html>. 
126 Our initial plan was to include examples (such as article 2 Dutch Copyright Act 1912) of such 
analyses in this report, but in performing the functional analysis test we realised that it is 
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cumbersome process and certainly not something that should have to be 
performed on the user level for each formal requirement individually. In 
addition, the principles set by the commission would provide too little guidance 
in that respect. Therefore, this approach will not provide the necessary legal 
certainty. The same is true for case law. Although, judges are better equipped for 
functionally analysing formal requirements, it is unfeasible having to sit and wait 
for probably a long time for answers that are needed today. Finally, the solution 
presented by the Huls-commission unfortunately does not urge the legislator to 
rethink formal requirements as such and examine whether they are still up to 
date. 127 
4.3.3 The Draft EU Directive on Electronic Commerce 
The EU Draft Directive on Electronic Commerce addresses formal 
requirements in article 9, by stating that Member States have to: 
 
“Ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the contractual process neither 
prevent the effective use of electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being 
deprived of legal effect and validity on account of their having been made 
electronically.” 
 
Notice that signatures are not included here, because the EU Directive on 
Electronic Signatures is said to be dealing with the subject. This is, however, not 
completely true, since in its article 1 the E-signatures Directive excludes aspects 
related to the conclusion and validity of contracts or other legal obligations. 
Article 9 does not mention the way in which Member States should be dealing 
with formal requirements in their legislation. In the Explanatory Memorandum 
of the Directive, however, a strong indication exists that Member States will 
have to take the functional-analysis approach in that a systematic review of 
legislation is required: 
 
“The Member States have an obligation to succeed, carry out a systematic review of 
those rules which might prevent, limit or deter the use of electronic contracts and to 
carry out this review in a qualitative way, i.e., not seek simply to amend the key words 
in the rules (e.g. “paper”) but to identify everything which might in practice prevent the 
                                                                                                                        
sheer drudgery and, thus, certainly not the proper way to a reasonably speedy solution of 
legal uncertainty with respect to formal requirements.  
127 Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p.13, It is crucial that there is a realistic assessment by 
policymakers of the extent to which formal requirements that have traditionally been 
recognised in national legal systems remain relevant in the digital context. For instance, 
the warning function of written form may be less important in an electronic environment.  
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“effective” use of electronic contracts.” (Italic by the drafters of the draft 
directive)128 
 
Since, however, the method of adjusting formal requirements to enable 
electronic contracting to the fullest potential is not named explicitly, other 
methods of working may be permitted as well. As long as the Member States 
live up to the obligation to succeed in allowing electronic contracting 
notwithstanding the existence of formal requirements.  
4.4 The generic-functionalist approach 
4.4.1 General 
The second method under the functionalist approach, what we call the generic-
functionalist approach, does not require a thorough review of form 
requirements in legislation, neither does it provide detailed rulings for electronic 
communication. The generic-functionalist approach is based on basic principles, 
which are derived from the functions of form requirements. These principles do 
not have to represent every imaginable feature and function of signatures, 
writings and other form requirements, but should at least hold basic conceptions 
of relevant criteria for electronic communication. Where the application of these 
principles is less obviousness, there is the possibility to make an exception with 
respect to certain form requirements.129  
4.4.2 Illustrations of the generic-functionalist approach 
4.4.2.1 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
The generic-functionalist approach is embodied in the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Electronic Commerce, where it is called the functional-equivalent 
approach.130 Most notably, the articles 6 to 8 are relevant to form 
requirements.131 In these provisions, the UNCITRAL has set up a hierarchy of 
                                                   
128 Proposal EU-Directive E-commerce (1998), p. 25,  
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/eleccomm/com586en.pdf>. 
129 See, for instance, the exceptions in Section 8 of the Victorian draft law (paragraph 3.2.3.2). 
130See UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 16. Because the term 'functional-equivalent 
approach' could easily be confused with the specific-functionalist approach, we will further 
use the term ‘generic-functionalist approach'.  
131 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 47, these articles should be read in coherence with each 
other. 
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form requirements, requiring different levels of reliability, traceability and 
inalterability. This hierarchy goes from writings, signed writings up to signed 
originals.132 Thus, the UNCITRAL has not looked for one-to-one equivalents 
but: 
 
"single[d] out basic functions of paper-based form requirements, with a view to 
providing criteria, which, once they are met by data messages, enable such data 
messages to enjoy the same level of legal recognition as corresponding paper 
documents performing the same function."133 
 






Writing Information is accessible: usable for subsequent reference 
Identification of a person 
Indication of person’s approval of the information 
Signed writing 
Reliability (depending on  the purpose of data message) 
Completeness 
Inalterability 
Reliable assurance of 
integrity 
Depending on purpose of information generation 
Signed original 
Display of the information 
Table 4: Hierarchy of form requirements 
 
The provisions leave room for exceptions, however, the intention is not to 
enable blanket or numerous exceptions, which would bring down efficacy of the 
Model Law.134   
4.4.2.2 Other examples: UETA, UCITA, UECA 
In paragraph 3.2.3, we have already mentioned the Victorian draft law as an 
illustration of legislation using the UNCITRAL Model Law as an example. The 
generic-functionalist approach introduced by the Model Law has also been 
followed in other (draft) legislation, such as the Draft Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act (UETA)135 and the Draft Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act136 in the United States137 and the Uniform Electronic 
                                                   
132 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 17, 49. 
133 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 18. 
134 UNCITRAL Model Law (1996), No. 52. The possibility to make exceptions should add to the 
acceptability of the Model Law.  
135 Available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm#ueccta>. 
136 Available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm#ucita>. 
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Commerce Act (UECA) of Canada.138 Although these laws probably drew 
inspiration from the Model Law,139 the end result is, however, tailored to 
national situations. All three examples mentioned - UETA, UCITA, and UECA 
- put great emphasis on the principles of freedom of contract and technology 
neutrality. These laws provide a framework or minimum requirements for 
electronic transactions, but parties are free to agree on other or heavier 
requirements: in the same way parties concluding a contract orally often want to 
confirm the contract in paper.140 Neither of these laws prescribes certain 
techniques to fulfil formal requirements and all of them have open definitions 
of 'electronic', 'electronic documents' (messages or records) and 'electronic 
signatures' (authentication).141  
Both UETA and UECA follow the hierarchical pattern of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law by addressing writing, signed writing and signed original.142 UCITA 
more generally addresses electronic records and authentication, stating that these 
methods may not be denied legal effect, leaving it to the parties concerned to set 
their own requirements143 and sets specific requirements for proof of 
authentication.144 
 
All three initiatives - UETA, UCITA and UECA - are drafted, however, within a 
Common Law system. The Civil Law elaboration of the principle of minimalism 
may well be shaped differently. Most likely, Civil Law systems would put an 
emphasis on the implementation of reliability requirements with respect to 
electronic documents and electronic signatures.145 At present, there are no 
readily available (draft) laws in Civil Law countries that start from the minimalist 
or more specifically the generic-functionalist approach.146 The Dutch Ministry 
of Justice is, however, examining the application of the generic-functionalist 
                                                                                                                        
137 Both the UETA and the UCITA are drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws. 
138 Available at <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/euecafa.htm>. 
139 The UECA is explicitly based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, see introductory remarks in the 
UECA. 
140 See Section 107 of UCITA and Section 5 of UETA. See also introductory remarks in the 
UECA. 
141 See Section 102 UCITA, Section 2 UETA and Section 1 UECA. 
142 See UETA Sections 7-11 and UECA Sections 7 (Requirement for information to be in 
writing), 8 (Providing information in writing), 9 (Providing information in specific form), 10 
(Signatures) and 11 (provision of originals). 
143 See Section 107 and the explanatory comments on that section. 
144 See Section 108. 
145 See paragraph 2.4. 
146 A few years ago, the Danish government announced their intention to draft legislation based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, but the draft law that was finally 
presented is concerned with digital signatures and Certification Authorities. Available at: 
<http://www.fsk.dk/fsk/div/hearing/draft.html>. 
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approach in administrative law (electronic administrative decisions) and there 
may be other initiatives in Civil Law countries that have not yet surfaced. 
4.5 Evaluation of the specific-functionalist and generic-
functionalist approach 
Having described both the specific-functionalist and generic-functionalist 
approach, it is time for an evaluation of these approaches before drawing 
conclusions.  
A strong argument in favour of the functionalist approach generally is the open 
attitude towards new techniques as well as future developments it allows rather 
than discouraging electronic commerce activities with premature and inflexible 
legislation. Furthermore, the functionalist approach seems to be better suited to 
deal with formal requirements in its entirety. In the case where situations have 
crystallised out and prove to need further regulation after all, more detailed rules 
can still be issued (for instance in the form of co-regulation). Having made these 
general remarks, we will now more particularly address the specific-functionalist 
and the generic-functionalist approach. 
 
The specific-functionalist approach does justice to the diversity in formal 
requirements and, thus, the different reasons for having these requirements in 
laws. Every formal requirement can be judged on its merits and accordingly 
adjusted to electronic communication. Moreover, the legislator can more 
fundamentally examine the necessity of formal requirements in general or with 
respect to electronic communication in particular and abolish outdated 
requirements completely.  
The functional-analysis test is, however, most notably suitable for legislators 
when actually wanting to update existing formal requirements as a long-term 
project. Reviewing each and every formal requirement is a very cumbersome 
and time-consuming process. Dutch law alone contains many formal 
requirements,147 which have been included in the law for different reasons and 
not in every instance these reasons are obvious from the law itself or its 
Explanatory Memorandum. In addition, reviewing the law in such a detailed way 
brings an extra danger of looking for detailed solutions as well. In other words, 
in our experience it is difficult to avoid technology-dependent ways of dealing 
with formal requirements under the functional-analysis approach, as a result of 
which the law may become too rigid and closed to new developments. There is 
now a situation where we do not and cannot know all the possible techniques 
                                                   
147 See a non-exhaustive list of formal requirements in Huydecoper/Van Esch (1997), p. 77, 
Note 16 and p. 177. 
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and their legal implications, which is different from the once surveyable paper 
environment where only paper and pen existed. But the inclination to look for 
equivalent techniques in order to make the subject matter manageable would be 
all too human. 
 
The generic-functionalist approach is no match for the thoroughness of its 
specific counterpart. In the specific-functionalist approach requirements of form 
are more fundamentally being dealt with, because of its systematic review of 
each and every (or the most relevant) requirements. In the process, outdated 
formal requirements can de identified and removed from legislation. The 
generic-functionalist approach is a rougher way of dealing with the issue in that 
it will generally be blind to the nuances of form requirements.  
On the other hand, the generic-functionalist approach displays greater flexibility 
in having the ability to provide a swifter solution to the problem of form 
requirements. This approach does not necessarily require a systematic review of 
each form requirement. It would suffice to distil objective criteria by generally 
analysing the functions of forms that are found relevant in judicial matters and 
more specifically electronic communications. The UNCITRAL Model on 
Electronic Commerce presents an excellent example of how to perform such an 
analysis. In case of doubt, the legislator can exclude certain form requirements 
from the general ruling and decide to subject these requirements to further 
scrutiny. The specific-functionalist approach and the generic-functionalist 
approach are not mutually exclusive and, if necessary, the former can be 
supplemental in special instances. This may alleviate some of the roughness of 
the generic-functionalist approach. 
Moreover, the generic-functionalist approach per definition has a technology-
neutral character, because the legislator will be forced to look for general rather 
than detailed rules. In addition, the generic-functionalist approach leaves room 
for possible, future international approaches to form requirements in electronic 
commerce. The specific-functionalist approach is too focused on the national 
position to also allow for an international method of approach.148 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analysed and evaluated two approaches under the 
functionalist approach: the specific-functionalist approach and the generic-
functionalist approach. 
                                                   
148See Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 150, “The international legal acceptance of electronic 
authentication technologies will be impeded if each legal system clings to its own parochial conception of what 
constitutes a signature, which will also lead to increasing trade disputes and international tension.” 
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The specific-functionalist approach is concerned with identifying functional 
equivalents to writings and signatures for fulfilling specific form requirements 
electronically. The central question under this approach is: can electronic 
techniques fulfil the same functions as writings and signatures, considering all 
the reasons for legislators to include this form requirement in legislation in the 
first place and under what conditions? An affirmative answer to this question 
would mean that (certain) electronic documents and signatures are adequate for 
complying with the formal requirements at issue. Because this approach would 
signify a complete review of form requirements in national legislation, it does 
justice of the nuances of form requirements and provides a good opportunity to 
get rid of outdated form requirements. A drawback of this approach, however, 
is that it is cumbersome and time-consuming.  
The generic-functionalist approach involves the formulation of general 
provisions, which indicate under what conditions electronic techniques can fulfil 
formal requirements. These conditions may include criteria with respect to the 
readability, reliability, inalterability, traceability etc. Depending on the basic 
functions of which it is paramount that they are fulfilled by writings, signed 
writings, signed originals etc., electronic communication may be legally 
recognised. This approach does not require a complete review of legislation, 
because basic principles will be applicable to electronic communication in 
general. In that respect, the approach has a rough edge which does not take into 
account the specifics of form requirements. The advantage of this approach, 
however, is that a more swift resolution of the form requirement problem is 
possible. Moreover, in the generic-functionalist approach the risk of focusing on 
specific technologies is minimal and there is room for possible, future 
international formula for the issue of form requirements. 
It is, furthermore, important to notice that these approaches are not mutually 
exclusive: legislator's can decide to choose the one approach to solve things on a 
short notice and the other approach to more fundamentally address (some) 
form requirements as a long term project.  
 
Having summarised the findings of this chapter, we now come to a conclusion. 
On the basis of the evaluation of the approaches and considering the need to 
make an end to legal uncertainty, we find a short-term solution and, therefore, 
the generic-functionalist approach, preferable to a solution that will take a lot of 
time to take effect, such as performing the functional-analysis test. Formal 
requirements are perceived a problem to electronic contracting today and the 
legislator should deal with issue on a short as possible notice. The legislator 
should, however, not completely sacrifice the virtues of the specific-functionalist 
approach and leave options for more fundamental assessment open in instances 
where the general principles prove to be too rough an instrument. Nevertheless, 
this should desirably be an exception to the rule.  
Having dealt with the issue along the lines of the generic-functionalist approach, 
the legislators may still decide to perform a full review of form requirements. In 
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that process outdated form requirements can, for instance, be eliminated from 
legislation completely. Other interdependent issues for the long-term process, 
which the legislator should take into consideration, are the redefinition of 
certain concepts, e.g. the notion of traditional signatures, and international co-
operation. Redefinition of form requirements may present an opening for 
addressing the legal aspects of electronic communication more uniformly on an 
international level.149 
                                                   
149 See also Kuner & Miedbrodt (1999), p. 150-151. 
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5. Conclusions & 
recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
To conclude this research report, all that remains is to formulate 
recommendations and to provide an integral presentation our observations and 
conclusions. The main aim of our research was to provide recommendations to 
the legislator when addressing legal requirements of form in legislation. In the 
following paragraphs we will address issues which the legislator should take into 
account in order to participate in clear discussions on electronic authentication 
and workable legislation concerning form requirements. These issues are: 
 
(1) Terminological perspicuity 
(2) Contextual perspicuity 
(3) Minimalism 
 
The order of these issues is not arbitrary, but reflects the chronology in which 
the legislator should deal with the subject of formal requirements in an 
electronic environment. 
5.2 Terminological perspicuity 
As obvious as it may seem, but before elaborating on a subject (in discussions, 
negotiations, legislation etc.) it is important to be clear as to the terminology 
used. As far as electronic authentication is concerned, it is unfortunately turning 
into a modern version of the Tower of Babel.  
The term 'signature' may have different meanings for lawyers from distinct legal 
systems (most notably Common Law and Civil Law systems) and different 
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countries, as well as for lawyers and people with a technical background. 
Moreover, the terms 'electronic signature' and 'digital signature' are often used as 
synonyms, whereas from a technical viewpoint they can be clearly distinguished. 
Electronic signatures involve all technologies, which replace hand-written 
signatures in an electronic environment. Digital signatures are technological 
applications, which use asymmetric encryption to ensure the authenticity of 
electronic messages and the integrity of the contents of these messages.  
Furthermore, 'electronic signature' and 'digital signature' are not uniform 
concepts: within these concepts different forms of techniques can be 
distinguished, which may be quite distinct with respect to their functions and 
their feasibility to "sign" electronic documents. Whereas the traditional forms 
(writing, paper, witnesses etc.) of performing legal acts were unambiguous, 
technology has many facets and is not as easily put into the straitjacket of formal 
requirements.  
Before starting any legislative process, the legislator should have a clear picture 
of relevant and essential terminology with respect to the subject they intend to 
regulate. As the circumstances surrounding the realisation of the draft EU 
Directive on Electronic Signatures clearly show, confusion of tongues can be 
one of the reasons for a serious complication of the legislative process.150 
In order to get a clear picture the legislator should seek the co-operation of 
academics and industry. Valuable information and advice can both nationally 
and internationally be obtained by involving different disciplines in the 
preparatory work and the process itself. Besides seeking advice, government 
officials should themselves be educated concerning the subject, since they have 
to be able to make choices in the matter. 
5.3 Contextual perspicuity 
Once having the terminology right, it is important to clearly see the different 
contexts of electronic authentication and formal requirements. Depending on 
the perspective one takes the consequences may differ.  
One important difference in context is that of Civil Law systems versus 
Common Law systems. Electronic-authentication legislation is often mutually 
compared without expressly considering the fact that these systems differ a lot 
in the way formal requirements are being dealt with traditionally in each system. 
These traditional differences may, however, very well have an impact on how 
new legislation is or should be addressing electronic authentication or form 
requirements in electronic communication. Even within legal systems of the 
same family there may be dissimilarities, which could be a reason for regulating 
                                                   
150 Dumortier & Van Eecke (1999b), p. 106-107. 
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these issues differently. Thus, when using (draft) legislation in other countries as 
an example, one should know about essential similarities and differences 
between the other and one's own legal system. 
Moreover, it is important to keep an eye on the context as far as the 
international level is concerned. Having all these distinct systems on a national 
level, international approaches may adopt a middle course to satisfy the 
requirements of different legal systems. Whereas national legislation can be 
more concretely tailored to the national situation, international initiatives will 
probably adopt a more open or abstract language, in order to be acceptable to a 
large number of countries. Therefore, besides looking at differences between 
legal systems on a national level, one should also take into account these 
differences when evaluating initiatives internationally. 
5.4 Minimalism 
Once having attained terminological and contextual perspicuity, one can start to 
pursue the fundamental issue of how to actually address formal requirements. 
In advance, it is significant to mention that form requirements should be dealt 
with coherently. Neither the situation where only signatures are addressed nor 
the situation where signatures are addressed in one legal instrument and other 
form requirements in another is preferable. Traditionally, signature, writing and 
other form requirements belong together, because a hand-written signature 
solely exists by the grace of paper, and should therefore be addressed together. 
Since the market is constantly moving and we do not know what lies ahead of 
us as far as technological and e-commerce developments are concerned, the 
legislator should stay away from detailed, technology-dependent legislation. 
More detailed, technologically oriented legislation may be an option in the 
future, when markets and technology are more clearly shaped and there still 
turns out to be a need to expressly promote certain solutions in certain areas. By 
then, the real problems may be clear enough to address them by more specific 
rules.  
For now, the legislator should rather take a minimalist approach towards form 
requirements and electronic communication. In the minimalist approach, 
legislation does not address specific techniques and models, such as digital 
signatures and PKIs. This approach allows for the different functions that 
techniques have to fulfil under national legal systems, in which case we have 
called it the functionalist approach, while creating openness towards new 
techniques and adventitious developments. These functions may be the ones 
that have to be fulfilled by traditional formal requirements, but it would also be 
possible to identify more general notions with respect to electronic 
communication, such as is the case with the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
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Electronic Commerce. The minimalist approach leaves room for self-regulation 
or co-regulation, if necessary. 
 
Observing the principle of minimalism, the legislator can take two directions. 
Both present valuable ways of dealing with the subject matter.  
The first one, the specific-functionalist approach, involves a systematic review of 
formal requirements. The analysis determines whether or not a form 
requirement can be complied with electronically or if it is outdated altogether. 
This analysis involves an examination of the considerations behind formal 
requirements and an assessment of whether electronic communication can 
satisfy these considerations. This solution allows a fundamental assessment of 
formal requirements. The drawback here is that reviewing each form 
requirement is a cumbersome and time-consuming process and is not likely to 
provide a solution soon. 
The second way, the generic-functionalist approach, involves a more general solution. 
In this approach, the legislator drafts provisions containing general principles 
and criteria for electronic communication in general,151 which remove 
uncertainty as to the legal status of electronic documents and electronic 
signatures. This approach allows a quicker resolution of the issue, but is blind to 
the nuances in considerations for the rationale of individual form requirements. 
At this point, we think the legislator should nonetheless primarily focus on the 
generic-functionalist approach to achieve a solution on short notice. We believe 
that the edges can be taken off this approach by allowing exceptions in hard 
cases, meaning that some form requirements can be excluded when the impact 
of a general provision needs more clarity in advance. Having dealt with the issue 
along the lines of the generic-functionalist approach, there is still room for 
performing a full review of form requirements, if found to be necessary. As a 
result of that review outdated form requirements can be eliminated from 
legislation completely. 
Apart from a quicker resolution of the form-requirement problem, the generic-
functionalist approach may in the course of time present an incentive for a more 
international approach to form requirements. An international approach is 
attractive because electronic commerce is an international phenomenon and it 
would remove some of the legal barriers caused by differences in legal systems. 
Before considering an international approach, it is however necessary to 
redefine form requirements and most notably the traditional signature for the 
international context, because of the different connotations the concepts have in 
the various legal systems. Part of the redefinition process could already take 
place when drafting generic rules for electronic communication. 
                                                   
151 The legislator may want to differentiate between different areas of law and provide separate 
principles for private law, criminal law and administrative law. 
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5.5 Final remarks 
Here we have presented recommendations to legislators on which 
considerations should be taken into account when addressing the subject matter 
of legal requirements of form in the light of ICT developments. Before 
addressing the subject at all, terminological perspicuity and contextual 
perspicuity should be prerequisites. When addressing the issue itself, the 
legislator should observe the principle of minimalism and take a functionalist 
approach towards form requirements and electronic communication. The 
functionalist approach should be worked out by issuing general principles and 
criteria for electronic communication. In this study we have not elaborated on 
the actual contents of these general principles and criteria, apart from setting the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as an example. Aside from the fact that the definite 
development of these criteria will (still) depend on the legal system involved, we 
feel that further (international) research is necessary before it is be possible to 
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7. Samenvatting 
Met de opmars van Electronic Commerce onstaat de behoefte aan elektronische 
alternatieven voor de handmatige handtekening. In deze studie wordt onder de 
term Electronic Commerce verstaan: ‘zakendoen op het Internet’. De sterke 
toename van het commerciële gebruik van het Internet heeft ervoor gezorgd dat 
overheden, bedrijven en Internet gebruikers steeds vaker geconfronteerd 
werden met een scala een juridische rechtsvragen. Eén van de belangrijkste 
vragen die in dit verband opkomt is de vraag wat de juridische status is van 
elektronische of digitale handtekeningen.    
   
Dit onderzoek bouwt voort op twee eerder verschenen ITeR onderzoeken: De 
juridische status van digitale handtekeningen door Van der Hof (1997), alsmede 
Geschriften en handtekeningen: een achterhaald concept? door Huydecoper & Van 
Esch.(1997).  Eerst genoemde studie inventariseert de juridische ontwikkelingen 
en praktische initiatieven met betrekking tot digitale handtekeningen in een 
aantal Europese Lidstaten. De tweede studie analyseert wat geschriften en 
handtekeningen zijn en met welke reden zij door de Nederlandse wetgever als 
vormvoorschrift voor het verrichten van een bepaalde rechtshandeling worden 
voorgeschreven. Vervolgens wordt nader ingegaan op de vraag of 
rechtshandelingen ten aanzien waarvan in de wet vormvereisten worden gesteld 
ook elektronisch wijze verricht kunnen worden, alsmede wat de juridische status 
is van elektronische berichten en elektronische handtekeningen.  
 
Deze bijdrage beoogt een stapje verder te zetten op de digitale handtekeningen-
route. Het doel is om aanbevelingen te doen aan de Nederlandse wetgever ten 
behoeve van de (aanpassing van) wettelijke vormvoorschriften in de 
Nederlandse wetgeving. Alvorens te komen tot de formulering van deze 
aanbevelingen is het noodzakelijk om stil te staan bij de context waarin 
(elektronische) authenticatie plaatsheeft en bij de al uitgevaardigde wetten en 
regelgeving, alsmede de daarin gekozen benaderingen.  
 
Hiertoe worden allereerst een vijftal algemene topics in kaart gebracht 
(hoofdstuk 2) die het onderwerp van studie in een breder perspectief plaatsen:  
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• De aantrekkelijkheid van digitale handtekeningen 
• Techniek-onafhankelijkheid versus technologie-afhankelijkheid 
• Nationale benaderingen versus internationale benaderingen van 
elektronische autheticatie 
• Civil Law versus Common Law 
• Regulering versus zelfregulering 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden vervolgens de benaderingen met betrekking tot 
wetgeving en regulering van elektronische authenticatie geï dentificeerd alsmede 
geanalyseerd. 
 
De volgende drie benaderingen worden onderscheiden: 
 
• De digitale handtekening-benadering 
• De tweetraps-benadering 
• De minimalistische benadering 
 
Het hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met een synthese en evaluatie van deze 
benaderingen, alsmede met onze tussenconclusie. In deze tussenconclusie geven 
wij de voorkeur aan de minimalistische benadering. Deze benadering biedt 
namelijk rechtszekerheid voor de markt zonder nieuwe technologische 
ontwikkelingen te belemmeren door nodeloos gedetailleerde regelgeving. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt deze minimalistische benadering nader onder de loep 
genomen en verder onderverdeeld in de specifieke functionele benadering en de 
generieke functionele benadering. Na een behandeling en evaluatie van beide 
benaderingen kiezen wij voor laatstgenoemde benadering. Ofschoon beide 
benaderingen waardevol zijn bij de aanpak van vormvoorschriften in het licht 
van ICT, geeft de generieke functionele benadering vooral op de korte termijn 
een oplossing en biedt deze benadering tevens betere mogelijkheden voor een 
internationale aanpak van elektronische authenticatie en vormvoorschriften in 
digitalibus meer in het algemeen. 
 
Aan de hand van de voorgaande hoofdstukken formuleren wij de resultaten van 
dit onderzoek als aanbevelingen voor de wetgever. Aan de hand van deze 
aanbevelingen wordt duidelijk hoe de overheid in onze visie dient om te gaan 
met de wettelijke vormvereisten in het licht van ICT. De wegever zal allereerst 
de terminologie rondom het onderwerp elektronische authenticatie moeten 
beheersen en de wisselende context waarin vormvoorschriften kunnen worden 
geplaatst goed in het oog dienen te houden. Samenwerking met wetenschap en 
bedrijfsleven zijn daarbij van groot belang. Bij het daadwerkelijk ontwikkelen 
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van wetgevingsactiviteiten zal de wetgever ten slotte een minimalistische 
beandering moeten kiezen om ruimte te laten voor nieuwe ontwikkelingen in 
een markt die continu in beweging is. 
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